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Summary 
In October 2011, the Commission presented a proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law (CESL), an optional regulatory framework available to 
both consumers and professional traders within the EU. The objective of the 
proposal is to facilitate engagement in cross-border commerce for 
consumers and small traders. All provisions relevant for an international 
transaction are included, as well as a complete set of consumer protection 
rules.  
 
If the CESL becomes adopted, it will enter into force in the complex area of 
international trade law. Here, several frameworks similar to the CESL 
already exist. The CISG, the PECL, the PICC and the DCFR are some 
examples. However, this type of transaction is mainly covered by the 
contracting parties’ domestic laws. Whenever more than one domestic law 
applies, conflict rules are used to decide which one is applicable. Within the 
EU, the Rome I Regulation and the Rome II Regulation are the main 
regulations dealing with conflict.  
 
In order for the CESL to function within the area of private international 
law, the proposal must address both current conflict rules and substantive 
provisions with which it may collide. Although this has allegedly been 
achieved with the CESL, critics have not been satisfied, claiming that this 
lack of clarity would result in clashes of conflicting laws if the CESL were 
to be adopted.  
 
In this thesis, the following areas have been examined: current EU conflict 
rules, substantive provisions similar to the CESL, the CESL proposal and 
the three most debated conflict issues regarding the CESL. The following 
can thus be concluded regarding the most central conflict of law issues 
expected to arise if the CESL enters into force:  
 
Regarding the relationship between the CESL and current conflict rules, it 
can be stated that the CESL applies via the Rome Regulations or other 
conflict rules that apply. This application will create two main conflict 
issues. The first is if a third state becomes involved in a situation where the 
CESL applies, the parties’ choice to use the CESL will risk becoming void. 
This is how private international law is structured. The CESL is thereby not 
fully compliant with current conflict rules. The second problem is the 
uncertainty regarding how the CESL relates to different mandatory 
provisions in the EU. In the Rome Regulations, these mandatory provisions 
are stated as superior to the law that otherwise applies to situation, however, 
this is not stated in the CESL. Nevertheless, the CESL declares that the 
Rome Regulations should apply within its scope. Here, the proposal 
contradicts itself.  
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Concerning the CESL and similar substantive provisions, it is evident that 
there will be relatively little incompatibility if the CESL enters into force. 
The reason for this is that the majority of these provisions are optional. 
Therefore, it does not matter if they have the same scope of application as 
the CESL nor contain the same rules. No conflicts will occur as long as the 
parties do not actively opt-in to these substantive rules. The only substantive 
law likely to cause conflicts with the CESL is the CISG. The main issue in 
the relationship between the CESL and CISG is the declaration in the CESL 
stating that whenever the CESL applies, the CISG no longer does. This opt-
out of the CISG has been argued to be invalid. If it were to indeed be 
invalid, the question would be as to which framework would be superior. 
However, if the opt-out provision is valid the question is rather as to what 
extent the CISG is eliminated.  
 
From a wider perspective, it can be concluded that several conflict of law 
issues are likely occur if the CESL enters into force. Many suggestions have 
been presented in the academic discourse on how to solve them. Several 
alterations could be made to the CESL in order to minimise the creation of 
conflict issues. However, conflicts will most likely still occur. This is 
unavoidable when adding legislation to an already well-regulated and highly 
complex area of law. The question is therefore whether the benefits of 
adopting the CESL will outweigh the conflict issues its adoption will create. 
The answer to this is most likely negative.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Sammanfattning 
I oktober 2011 presenterade Europeiska kommissionen förslag till en ny 
gemensam europeisk köplag, Common European Sales Law (CESL). Lagen 
är tänkt att frivilligt kunna användas av konsumenter och mindre 
näringsidkare när de handlar över nationsgränserna. Målsättningen med 
CESL är att reglera de flesta tänkbara situationer som kan uppkomma vid ett 
internationellt köp samt innehålla alla nödvändiga konsumentskyddsregler.  
 
Om CESL träder i kraft kommer den att bli en del av den internationella 
handelsrätten. Inom rättsområdet finns redan ett flertal internationella 
regelverk som liknar CESL, till exempel CISG, PECL, PICC och DCFR. 
Det är dock i huvudsak avtalsparternas nationella lagar som reglerar ett 
gränsöverskridande köp. När flera nationella lagar är tillämpliga samtidigt 
måste lagvalsregler bestämma vilken som ska gälla. Inom EU är Rom I- och 
Rom II-förordningen de centrala lagvalsreglerna.  
 
För att CESL ska kunna vara kompatibel med den internationella 
privaträtten måste lagen tydligt ange hur den ska förhålla sig dels till 
nuvarande lagvalsregler, dels till materiella bestämmelser som den riskerar 
att kollidera med. Även om dessa förhållanden har angivits i CESL, är 
många kritiska till redogörelsen och hävdar att oklarheter kommer att skapa 
lagkonflikter om CESL antas.  
 
I denna uppsats har följande undersökts: nuvarande lagvalsregler i EU, 
materiella bestämmelser som riskerar att kollidera med CESL, förslaget om 
CESL samt de tre mest omdebatterade potentiella lagkonflikterna avseende 
CESL. Mot denna bakgrund kan följande konstateras om vilka som är de 
mest centrala lagkonflikterna som kan uppstå om CESL träder i kraft:  
 
Gällande relationen mellan CESL och nuvarande lagvalsregler kan det 
fastställas att CESL tillämpas genom lagvalsregler, främst Rom I-
förordningen. Denna tillämpning kommer främst att skapa två problem 
gällande lagkonflikter. Det första problemet är om ett icke EU-lands lag blir 
tillämplig, på grund av lagvalsregler, riskerar avtalsparternas val av CESL 
att bli ogiltigt. Utfallet beror på de internationella privaträttsliga regler som 
finns idag och visar att CESL inte är fullt kompatibel med nuvarande 
lagvalsbestämmelser. Det andra problemet uppstår i och med oklarheten hur 
CESL förhåller sig till diverse tvingande regler inom EU. Rom I- och Rom 
II-förordningen anger att tvingande regler har företräde framför den lag som 
förordningarna utser som gällande, men det anser inte CESL. Trots detta 
anger CESL att Rom-förordningarnas bestämmelser gäller fullt ut inom 
CESL:s tillämpningsområde, vilket är motsägelsefullt.  
 
Beträffande CESL och materiella bestämmelser som förslaget riskerar att 
kollidera med, kan det konstateras att de flesta av dessa bestämmelser inte 
kommer att orsaka lagkonflikter med CESL. Anledningen är att de är 
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valbara och därmed endast tillämpliga samtidigt som CESL om parterna 
gjort ett aktivt val att använda dem. Det spelar således ingen roll om de 
materiella bestämmelserna har samma innehåll eller samma 
tillämpningsområde som CESL. De kommer inte att kollidera med CESL så 
länge parterna inte tillämpar dem. Det enda materiella regelverk som 
förutspås kollidera med CESL är CISG, eftersom CISG tillämpas 
automatiskt. Problemet är att CESL anger att så fort lagen tillämpas, är 
CISG inte längre tillämplig. Ståndpunkten har kriterats i den juridiska 
debatten för att vara ogiltig. Även om den skulle vara giltig, kvarstår frågor 
om i vilken utsträckning CISG blir bortvald. Lagkonflikter kommer med 
andra ord att uppstå oavsett om CESL:s bestämmelse om CISG är giltig 
eller inte.  
 
Det kan konstateras att flertalet lagkonflikter sannolikt kommer att uppstå 
om CESL antas. Många förslag har presenterats i den juridiska debatten om 
hur dessa konflikter skulle kunna lösas, men troligen kommer de aldrig att 
kunna lösas fullt ut. Det internationella rättsområde som CESL vill verka 
inom är alltför komplicerat. Frågan blir därmed om fördelarna med att anta 
CESL kommer överväga nackdelarna, såsom att lagkonflikter kommer 
uppstå. Troligtvis kommer nackdelarna att överväga.    
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Abbreviations 
B2B  Business to Business 
 
B2C  Business to Consumer 
 
B2SME Business to Small or medium-sized 
enterprise  
 
CECL The Commission on European 
Contract Law 
 
CESL The Common European Sales Law 
 
CFR  Common Frame of Reference 
 
CISG The United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods 
 
The Commission  The European Commission 
 
The Council  The European Council  
 
DCFR Draft Common Frame of 
References 
 
EC The European Community 
 
EEC The European Economic 
Community 
 
EU  The European Union 
 
The Parliament  The European Parliament 
 
PECL Principles of European Contract 
Law 
 
PICC Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts  
   
SGECC The Study Group on a European 
Civil Code 
 
SME Small or medium-sized enterprise 
 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 
 
UNCITRAL The United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law 
 
UNIDROIT International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Surveys2 conducted by the EU reveal that only one in ten traders in the 
European Union engage in cross-border trade within the common market. 
The surveys also affirm that out of all obstacles related to cross-border 
trade, contract law-related issues are viewed as one of the major barriers. 
Lesser concerns include tax regulations, additional costs, language and 
culture barriers and administrative requirements as well as difficulties 
related to delivery of goods. 3 The EU has previously attempted to facilitate 
cross-border trade using its legislative powers. They have, inter alia, tried to 
harmonize private international laws across member states and create 
directives to ensure a more uniform standard of rights connected to 
transactions, in order to facilitate transnational trade. 4 Despite these efforts, 
the issue still remains; the Union comprises 285 different contract laws. 6 
 
Over the course of the last few years, trans-border commerce has grown 
within the common market. This development is mainly due to the increase 
in trade activity via the Internet. This change has resulted in a greater 
number of consumers engaging in cross-border trade, a group often less 
competent than professional traders in handling differences in domestic 
contract laws. Often these consumers are not even aware of the provisions 
granted by the laws of their home state. 7 Discussions regarding the creation 
of a common European sales law have prospered in the EU for a long time. 
Subsequent to such recent developments, in 2011 the Commission presented 
a proposal for a framework intended to function as a set of contract rules 
usable for both traders and consumers. The framework was named the 
Common European Sales Law (CESL). 8 
 
Critics maintain that enforcing legislation as an alternative to 28 domestic 
laws and international provisions regarding trade will result in problems 
with private international law. This is because law conflict issues are 
susceptible to appear whenever there is more than one body of law 
applicable. However, the Commission seems not to share this concern. 9  
                                                
2 Eurobarometers 320 on European contract law in business-to-business transactions of 
2011 and Eurobarometer 321 on European contract law in consumer transactions of 2011. 
3 The CESL, p. 2.  
4 See further chapter 2 and chapter 3.3.  
5 This is the number of EU member states since Croatia joined in 2013. See all: 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (2013-12-08).  
6 Eidenmuller (2013), p. 8.  
7 The CESL, recital 17; DiMatteo, p. 226.  
8 See further regarding the CESL and how it has developed in chapter 4.1-4.3.  
9 Mak, p. 328. See further chapter 5.  
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1.2 Purpose and question formulations 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and present conflict of law issues 
expected to arise if the CESL enters into force. The focus is to provide an 
overview, and to examine further into, the potential problems already 
presented in the legal-academic discourse. Through doing so, we can 
illustrate the complications involved when new legislation is adopted into an 
already convoluted area such as that of transnational trade. Although 
suggestions for changes to the CESL will arise, the main aim of this 
presentation is to assess the issues so far raised rather than an outright 
attempt to find corresponding solutions. 
 
Since the CESL is not and perhaps will not enter into force as EU 
legislation, this study is of a speculative nature. The issues examined are not 
certain to occur in reality. This thesis will not speculate on, nor consider the 
chances for the CESL to become law. Regardless of what the future holds 
for the CESL, the work invested by EU bodies on the proposal cannot be 
ignored. A framework like the CESL, that approaches the possibility of a 
European contract law and maybe even a common civil law, is truly what 
the EU believes to be the future for Europe. EU bodies will therefore most 
likely have to deal with issues concerning conflict of law in the future, 
whether through this proposal or another, as common EU law generally 
collides with both domestic laws and international provisions.  
 
In view of the above, this thesis will revolve around the following questions:  
 
• What are the most central conflict of law issues expected to arise if 
the CESL enters into force? More specifically: 
 
o How will the CESL interact with current EU conflict rules?  
o How will the CESL interact with existing sales and contract 
provisions affecting cross-border trade within the EU?  
o Are there any suggestions presented in the debate on how to 
solve these predicted conflict issues? If yes, what is the 
content of these proposals?  
 
1.3 Methodology and materials 
The method used for this thesis is, partly, a classic legal dogmatic method 
and partly an analytical approach to a current debate. The term legal 
dogmatic method refers to the process of systematizing and analysing 
existing legislation10. The legal dogmatic method has been used to describe 
current laws and provisions potentially related to, or involved in, 
conceivable uses of the CESL. In examining the debate regarding potential 
conflict issues, an analytical approach has been applied in order to present 
                                                
10 Peczenik, p. 33.  
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and further explain opinions on the matter. An analytical approach, as 
stated in one of the thesis objectives, has been employed to gather opinions 
already identified and further develop, explain and compare their contents. 
 
From a more empirical understanding of the method used, it can be initially 
observed that the essay’s topic is narrow and the debate so new that the 
material available is limited. After examining relevant information on the 
topic, the most central conflict issues were identified on the basis of the 
views of academic commentators as to the key problems. Identified issues 
have then been subjected to deeper analysis, employing the same material 
used to determine their importance.  
 
Sources of information used in this thesis have been limited to include only 
those relevant for exploration of a potential legal problem regarding 
legislation that not yet has entered into force. This has resulted in the 
exclusion of case law and, to some extent, also legal doctrines as sources of 
information. As of yet, there has been no case law dealing with the issues 
examined in this thesis, since there is no legislation in force for the courts to 
consider. Regarding legal doctrine, few printed materials have so far been 
published discussing the issue since the unveiling of the CESL proposal in 
2011. Predominantly, research materials used have been relevant debate 
articles published in legal journals, often specialist journals dealing with the 
fields of private international law, contract law or trade law. Official 
published documents like the CESL proposal and related EU legislation 
have also been used to a great extent in order to examine the contentious 
issues. Legal doctrine has primarily been used to find information on current 
legislation relevant to the issues examined.   
 
1.4 Terminology  
This study appraises potential problems regarding conflict of laws in 
connection with the CESL. Depending on the use of terminology, the 
expression conflict of laws can have different meanings. In this essay, the 
statement conflict of laws (or conflict of law issues, conflict issues, law 
conflict issues) is not employed as a synonym for the area of law often 
called private international law, but a subgroup within this legal field. Aside 
from choice of law queries, other subgroups within private international law 
include questions on jurisdiction of courts and the enforcement of foreign 
member state court decisions. 11  
 
In this thesis, the expression conflict of laws refers to problems arising from 
situations where more than one law appears applicable but only one can be. 
These types of problems often arise if the parties involved are from different 
countries or if an agreement contains cross-border elements.  
                                                
11 See similar distinction in Van Calster, pp. 1-2.   
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1.5 Delimitations 
This thesis does not aim to present nor examine all conflict of law issues 
that might arise from enforcement of the CESL. Only issues considered to 
be the most pertinent to the debate will be examined12. These problems will 
be categorized into three main issues. The division is designated for 
pedagogical purposes and thereby does not necessarily reflect how the 
arguments themselves have been dealt with in the debate.  
 
Aside from the fragments of the debate giving rise to potential law conflict 
creators, a detailed presentation of the content of the CESL will not be 
made. The content of other regulatory frameworks, such as the CISG, will 
also not be examined in greater details. Nevertheless, an overview of the 
type of provisions contained in the latter frameworks will be presented. This 
is done in order to demonstrate their similarity to the CESL, since these 
resemblances can create law conflicts. The thesis will neither analyse the 
discourse regarding whether there is a need for the CESL in the 
transnational trade market, though we may briefly acknowledge that this 
debate has been very fierce13.  
 
The presentation is not addressed to a Swedish audience, but rather to the 
fictional average citizen of the EU. Swedish and other national regulations 
that might be relevant within the examined area will therefore not be 
addressed. For example Swedish legislation Lag (1987:822) om 
internationella köp14 will not be presented, even if, according to Swedish 
law, it takes precedence over the Rome I Regulation15 within its scope of 
application. The limitation is done in order to focus on central law conflicts 
that might arise, instead of presenting all legislation that could be applicable 
in relevant cases. This is not needed in order to answer the questions 
examined in this thesis.  
 
1.6 Disposition 
The contents of the thesis include the present, opening chapter (chapter 1) 
followed by four parts (chapter 2-5) and a final analysis (chapter 6).  
 
In order to understand the context and the content of the conflict issues dealt 
with in this presentation, regulatory frameworks and provisions that can be 
involved in a use of the CESL or impinge on the proposal’s sphere of 
                                                
12 Example of an interesting, but not central, conflict issue regarding the CESL is the 
priority between the CESL and established lex mercatoria provisions. See Dalhuisen, pp. 
303-317. Dalhuisen states that lex mercatoria should be seen as superior to the CISG. 
13 See, for example, Dalhuisen, p. 300.  
14 The law implements the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sale 
of Goods 1995. The same legislation has been implemented in Finland, France and Italy as 
well. See further Bisping, p. 3.  
15 See further chapter 2.2.1. 
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application are presented in chapters 2-3. Chapter 2 presents current EU 
conflict rules, which is legislation that the CESL will necessarily relate to. 
Chapter 3 introduces current substantive transnational sales and contract 
provisions applicable to cross-border transactions within the EU. As they 
exist within the same area that the CESL aspires to cover, conflicts are 
expected to arise therefrom.  
 
The CESL itself is introduced in chapter 4. A brief introduction is given 
regarding the background, purpose, scope of application, structure and 
content of the proposal. Chapter 5 introduces the law conflict issues that in 
the legal-academic discourse have been considered to be the most pertinent, 
divided into three categories. Finally, chapter 6 concludes which central 
conflict of law issues that are expected to arise if the CESL enters into force. 
Here, conclusions are drawn on how the CESL is anticipated to correlate 
with existing conflict rules as well as substantive provisions similar to the 
proposal. Suggestions that have been presented in the debate on how the 
issues can be solved will also be summarized. The analysis will lastly 
present my own conclusions regarding the proposal and its future.  
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2 EU Conflict of Law Rules  
2.1 Historical background  
The basic principle in the majority of existing conflict rules is that each 
private international law relationship should be handled by the legal system 
of the country where the issue has the closest or most relevant connection. 
Most countries and states would agree with this statement. What a relevant 
connection is, how it can be defined and whether there is any hierarchy of 
relevant connections are however issues more debated. Therefore, conflict 
rules can differ widely between countries. These differences arise because in 
general and despite their name, private international law is national law 
regulating international relations. 16  Despite this, the area of private 
international law has increasingly been subject to transnational 
harmonization. 17 
 
The EU in particular has put considerable effort into creating harmonious 
conflict rules applicable in all member states. 18 This action is motivated by 
the idea that differences in member states’ private international laws create 
great obstacles for trade and movement within the common market. If a 
conflict occurs between two different member states and diverging conflict 
rules in their domestic law demonstrate applicability of different states’ laws 
(which, for example, can be the case if different courts have jurisdiction in 
the matter in accordance with the lex fori principle19), there is no solution. 
Both alternatives are “correct” according to each state’s domestic 
legislation. Efforts made by the EU within the area of private international 
law are in line with the aim that the common market should be a place 
where goods, people, capital and services can move freely without obstacles 
(the four freedoms20 of the EU). 21 
 
Thus, the aim to create common conflict rules has not always been on the 
EU agenda. It was only recently that private international law regulations 
became a target for harmonization. 22 The very first EU treaty, the Rome 
Treaty23 (constructed by the EEC in 1958 which later became the basis for 
today’s EU cooperation24) focused on creating a common market. However, 
questions regarding conflict of law issues that might arise from this 
development were not mentioned. 25 Despite this, predictions were made 
                                                
16 Bogdan, pp. 3-4. 
17 Van Calster, p. 2.   
18 Stone, p. 3. 
19 See discussion on procedural issues in Van Calster, pp. 3-4. 
20 Today, this aim can be found in the TFEU (article 26.2).   
21 Bogdan, pp. 7-8; Stone pp. 3-4.  
22 Van Calster, p. 13.  
23 The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC).  
24 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm 
(2013-11-08).  
25 Bogdan, p. 6.  
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stating that a true common market with no significant trade obstacles would 
require harmonization of private international law. This opinion was first 
established in legal discourse; a view that the EU would soon acknowledge. 
As a result, harmonization gradually began to develop within the field. 26  
 
Juridical cooperation in civil matters was formally introduced as an 
objective for the EU with the arrival of the Maastricht Treaty27 in 1993. It 
was placed under the third pillar in the organization, indicating that the legal 
field not was a high priority for future harmonization efforts. The 
categorisation under the third pillar did however ensure that the question 
became a topic in discussions within the EU cooperation. In the EU 
covenant the Amsterdam Treaty28, that came into force 1997, the aim to 
cooperate in civil matters was moved from third to first pillar under the EC 
Treaty29, indicating that the EU intended to increase its focus on the matter. 
30 In article 65 of the EC Treaty the significance of such an act was further 
explained:  
 
“Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil mattes having cross-border 
implications […] necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, shall 
include […] (b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in Member 
States concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction.” 31 
 
This clarification is found under the title “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and 
Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons” raising uncertainty 
over whether the intended harmonization objectives only applied to these 
areas. 32 
 
In 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
entered into force as the new constitutional basis for the EU cooperation. 
The previous article 65 in the EC Treaty was replaced by article 81 in the 
TFEU and with this, the objective of harmonizing civil matters through EU 
legislation expanded. The goal of harmonizing civil matters was now 
asserted as applicable to all legal areas where law conflicts can occur from 
cross-border involvement. 33 Article 81 in the TFEU declares that:  
 
“The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border 
implications […] For the purpose of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the 
Council shall adopt measures, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning 
of the internal market, aimed at ensuring: […] (c) the compatibility of the rules 
applicable in the Member States concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction;” 34 
                                                
26 Bogdan, p. 7. 
27 Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community with a 
View to Establish the European Community.  
28 Amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts. 
29 The Amsterdam Treaty introduced changes to then-existing EU constitutional basis the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (the EC Treaty). 
30 Bogdan, pp. 8-9.  
31 The EC Treaty, article 65.  
32 Bogdan, pp. 9-10.  
33 Bogdan, pp. 9-10.  
34 The TFEU, article 81.  
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Today, harmonization of conflict rules concerning cross-border relations can 
be found in several European legal areas. These areas can broadly be 
divided into five categories, dealing with either: 1) civil jurisdiction and 
judgments 2) family matters 3) insolvency 4) procedural co-operations or 5) 
civil obligations. 35 An example of a conflict legislation concerning family 
matters is the 1996 Hague Convention36, while the Brussels I Regulation37 
can be seen as conflict rules under the category of civil jurisdiction and 
judgments. Regarding law conflicts arising from cross-border trade or 
international sales situations, the applicable rules are found under the 
category of civil obligations. Here, there are two main regulatory 
frameworks: the Rome I Regulation38 and the Rome II Regulation39. 40 Both 
of these were implemented in 2009. 41 In brief, the Rome I Regulation 
consists of conflict rules regarding contractual obligations, while the Rome 
II Regulation deals with law conflicts in pre-contractual obligations. Across 
both regulations, the majority of cross-border transactions are covered and 
thus can be subjected to the rulings within the scope of the provisions. 42 
 
2.2 Current conflict rules 
2.2.1 The Rome I Regulation  
When the Rome I Regulation (further referred to as “Rome I”) came into 
force in 2009, it had a great impact on conflict legislation in all EU member 
states. A new common framework used to decide the governing law for 
contractual obligations was created. 43 The Rome I provides, in its article 1, 
conflict of law rules regarding contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters. Even so, its application is excluded in cases such as if a 
contract relates to tax, customs or administrative matters (article 1.2). This 
regulatory framework is binding upon the courts of all member states having 
adopted the regulation. Parties to a contract are therefore not able to decide 
whether they want the Rome I to govern their contract or not. As long as all 
requirements for its application are met, it will apply regardless (article 1.1). 
                                                
35 Stone, p. 6.  
36 The Hague Convention of 19th October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the protection of Children. Through EU decisions 2003/93 and 2008/431 the 
Council authorized, in the interest of the Community, all member states to sign and ratify 
the convention. However, the EU is not itself part of the convention. See Stone, p. 10.  
37 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See further Stone, pp. 17-
19. 
38 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations.  
39 Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.  
40 Stone, pp. 6-11.  
41 Stone, p. 287 and p. 369. 
42 Stone, pp. 289-290 and p. 370.   
43 Stone, pp. 287-288.  
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Its application does not depend on reciprocity44. The law dealt with by the 
regulation will also govern the contract regardless of whether it is the law of 
a member state or not. The application is thereby universal (article 2).  
 
Articles 3-4 in the Rome I contain provisions that decide which law is valid 
in cases when more than one state’s law seems applicable. If the parties 
have chosen a law to govern their contract, the general rule is that this law is 
applicable (article 3). This choice of law must be made expressly. 
Alternatively, it has to be clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract 
or by the circumstances of the case (see article 3).  
 
If the parties have not agreed upon a law to govern their contract, the 
provisions for resolving the issue are found in article 4. In this article, 
different contract types are stated, each of which has a corresponding 
conflict rule (article 4.1). Each provision decides which relevant domestic 
law member states should consider as having the closest connection to the 
contract. This is usually done through identification of the characteristic 
performer. 45 The rule for contracts on the sale of goods asserts that the 
applicable regulatory framework is the law of the country where the seller 
has his/her habitual residence (article 4.1.a). The seller is therefore 
considered to be the characteristic performer in the case. If a contract 
addresses provision of services, the governing law is the law of the country 
where the service provider has his/her habitual residence (article 4.1.b). The 
rule is the same for sales contracts. Contracts concerning rights and 
obligations for immovable property are, on the other hand, governed by the 
law of the country where the property is located (article 4.1.c). Aside from 
these three examples, there are further contract types addressed in article 
4.1, for example franchise and distribution contracts. Article 4.2 concludes 
that if a contract cannot be categorized under any of the previous options, it 
should be under the law of the state where the considered characteristic 
performer has his/her habitual residence. Despite the provisions relating to 
contracts, the main rule regarding all types of contracts is found in article 
4.3. Here, it is stated that when it is clear from all circumstances in the case 
that the contract is more closely connected to another country than indicated 
by paragraphs 1 or 2, that other country’s law should apply. The previously 
presented conflict provisions in the article are therefore not definitive. The 
designated applicable law can always change under the circumstances of 
individual cases. The very last sentence of article 4 addresses all types of 
contracts where the applicable law has not been decided by previous 
regulations. It declares that these contracts are to be governed by the law of 
the country with the closest connection to the agreement (article 4.4). 
 
Since other conflict rules besides those in the Rome I are in force within EU 
law, the Rome I must adjust its relation to these, including those that might 
enter into force in the future. 46  Regarding the correlation with other EU 
instruments containing conflict provisions, a type of lex specialis rule is 
                                                
44 Stone, p. 289.  
45 Stone, p. 299 and p. 312.  
46 Bogdan, p. 122. 
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presented in article 23. The provision asserts that if, in a specific case, a 
conflict rule addresses the same contractual obligation as the Rome I, then 
the more specific rule takes priority. The relation to international 
conventions regarding the same matter is also addressed. Article 25 asserts 
that if an international convention is, along with the Rome I, also applicable 
and contains conflict provisions, then this convention should not be affected 
by the Rome I. The international convention applies as long as the minimum 
of one member state involved was party to the convention when it was 
adopted and the convention entered into force before the Rome I, i.e. before 
December 17, 2009 (articles 1, 28-29).  
 
Conflict issues can as well occur when other types of rules than those 
including conflict provisions are involved. The Rome I must therefore also 
determine its relation to these. In articles 6-9, the effects on weak-party 
contract rules and international mandatory provisions are addressed. 
Regarding weak-party provisions, there are three types protected: consumer 
contracts (article 6), insurance contracts (article 7) and individual 
employment contracts (article 8). Concerning a consumer contract, the 
fundamental rule is that the contract is governed by the law of the state were 
the consumer has his/her habitual residence (article 6.1). The parties may 
still agree to apply a different law to the contract, but this act cannot 
invalidate mandatory consumer provisions in the consumer’s home state 
(article 6.2). Example of such a mandatory consumer provision could be a 
domestic law stating that a trader must inform an interested consumer, in a 
clear way, about the effective APR47 offered for credit in conjunction with a 
purchase48. With article 6.2, the consumer can choose the overall most 
advantageous domestic law and can at the same time rely on consumer 
protection rules in his or her habitual state, even if the parties have not 
chosen the latter law to govern the contract otherwise. 49 The relation 
between the Rome I and international mandatory law (rules of ordre public) 
is addressed in article 9. Here, mandatory provisions are defined as rules 
protecting national public interests to the extent that the legislation applies 
in any situation falling within its scope, regardless of whether another law 
applies to the contract in accordance with the country’s private international 
laws or not (see article 9.2). These provisions often concern a country’s 
political, social or economic organization or interests (article 9.1). 50 
 
2.2.2 The Rome II Regulation 
Despite its name, the Rome II Regulation (further referred to as “Rome II”) 
came into force a few months before the Rome I, in 2009. 51 With the 
                                                
47 APR is the abbreviation for annual percentage rate. The effective APR is meant to show 
the real and final cost of a credit loan.   
48 This consumer protection provision can be found in the Swedish law 
Konsumentkreditlagen (2010:1846).  
49 Bogdan, p. 131. 
50 Bogdan, pp. 134-135.  
51 The Rome I article 29, the Rome II article 32.  
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regulation, new conflict rules used to decide the applicable law for pre-
contractual obligations were jointly established in all EU member states. 52  
 
The idea behind the Rome II was the same as for Rome I; to create a 
regulatory framework for determining the connecting factor (see chapter 
2.2.1) that gives applicability to a particular domestic law. 53  In the 
preamble of the Rome II, the Commission further develops the importance 
of adopting the regulation and states that a functioning inner market cannot 
be created without it. Such a framework enables predictability in a manner 
not pre-existing concerning the outcome of an unexpected event with 
damaging consequences that has occurred in a member state. The result is 
that the applicable law will be the same, regardless of which state’s court 
that presides over the case. 54 
 
Article 1 of the Rome II declares that the regulation applies in situations 
regarding conflict of laws for non-contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters (article 1.1). Its use is however excluded, inter alia, in 
cases where the non-contractual obligation arises out of family relationships 
or a violation of privacy or integrity rights (article 1.2.a and 1.2.g). Article 2 
contains further provisions relating to the scope of application of the Rome 
II. This provision states that the regulation covers damage arising out of tort, 
unjust enrichment55, negotiorum gestio56 and culpa in contrahendo57. It can 
also apply to pre-contractual obligations that are likely to arise, meaning acts 
made to prevent damages, for example orders for financial penalties. 58 
Similar to the Rome I, the application of the Rome II is universal and 
applies irrespective of whether or not the chosen law is that of a member 
state (article 3). 
 
Regarding the applicable law to an event that has already occurred, the 
general rule is that the applicable law is the one chosen by the parties 
(article 14). A choice of law can either be made before or after the 
damaging event occurred. However, a prior choice of law is only possible if 
all parties are commercial actors (article 14.1.b). The choice must be clearly 
stated regardless of the parties’ decision. Article 14.1 states that the choice 
“shall be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by 
circumstances of the case and shall not prejudice the rights of third 
parties”. The application of a chosen law equally cannot override provisions 
in the law of the forum if they are mandatory (article 16). This is 
irrespective of what is stated by the law otherwise applicable to the 
obligation.  
 
                                                
52 Bogdan, p. 145.  
53 Stone pp. 369-370.  
54 The CESL, recital 6, 8 and 14; Van Calster, p. 152.  
55 See definition in article 10 Rom I. 
56 An agent acts on behalf of a principal, without this person’s consent. See further 
definition in article 11. 
57 Duty to negotiate with care when concluding an agreement. See further definition in 
article 12.  
58 Compare with Stone, p. 371.  
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If the parties did not agree on a law to govern the event giving rise to the 
damage, the relevant provisions are found in article 4. The general rule is 
that the law of the country where the damage occurred will govern the 
contract (the lex loci damni principle). This is not necessarily the same place 
as where the event that caused the damage arose. In other words, it can be a 
case of two different countries. The article further states that if both the 
perpetrator and the victim had their habitual residence in the same country 
when the damage occurred, then this country’s law is applicable (article 
4.2). However, if there is an obvious closer connection to another country 
than which the Rome II provisions point to, that domestic law will apply 
(article 4.3). Similar to Rome I59, individual circumstances are thereby 
always most pertinent in deciding the applicable law if no choice has been 
made by the parties. 
 
The correlation between the Rome II and other conflict rules with an 
overlapping scope of application are addressed in articles 27-28. The 
content is the same as for the corresponding provisions in the Rome I60. The 
rule regarding other EU instruments containing conflict provisions state that 
these instruments have priority if they are more specific (article 27). For 
conflict rules in international instruments, the regulation states that these 
take precedence over the Rome II as long as the minimum of one member 
state was party to the convention when it was adopted and the convention 
entered into force before the Rome II, i.e. before January 11, 2009 (articles 
1, 30-32).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 Compare with article 4.3 in the Rome I.  
60 Compare with article 23 and 25 in the Rome I.  
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3 Existing Transnational Sales 
and Contract Legislation 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1980’s, several multilateral regulatory frameworks have entered 
into force that contain transnational sales and contract law provisions 
affecting cross-border trade within the EU. 61 Various market participants 
have created these frameworks, including private research groups, 
international trade and law unification groups, other transnational 
organizations as well as the EU. 62  The effects of these laws and 
conventions on international trade law and the extent to which they have 
been used in cross-border transactions can be discussed. Findings may vary 
depending on the project examined. Demonstrating their scepticism, many 
critics are either of the opinion that new frameworks need to be created 
within the area of international trade or by holding that this type of 
transnational legislation is unnecessary. The latter view is based on 
contracting parties preferring to use their party autonomy in creating their 
own rules or that they will choose a (domestic) law already existing. 63 
 
Regardless of the discourse surrounding transnational sales and contract 
legislation, their existence is irrefutable and, due to our increasingly 
globalized society, an increase in number is a strong possibility. 64 This 
chapter will present the most influential provisions dealing with the subject, 
firstly central international conventions and then those coming from the EU.  
 
3.2 International provisions 
3.2.1 The PECL 
A widely known transnational piece of legislation affecting cross-border 
trade within the EU is the Principles of European Contract Law, also known 
as the PECL. 65  The outline for the framework was created by the 
Commission on European Contract Law (CECL), a group66 of independent 
academics originating from all EU member states. 67 The PECL started as a 
                                                
61 Dalhuisen, p. 299; Fogt, p. 86.  
62 See following chapters 3.2-3.3 regarding the originators of the frameworks in force.  
63 See Fogt, p. 85, Dalhuisen, pp. 299-303 and Meyer pp. 389-395.  
64 See, for example, Twigg-Flesner, p. 26.  
65 Eidenmuller, p. 3.  
66 Danish law professor Ole Lando led the work of the group. See all group members: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclintro.html (2013-11-20).  
67 Lando (2001), p. 2.  
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private law project, however growing hegemony from the Parliament led to 
the project’s growth that, ultimately, began to finance it. 68  
 
With the PECL, the CECL aspired to create general principles of contract 
law common to all EU members. The aim was to form a base of legal 
obligations from provisions that most member states already had in common 
in their juridical systems. 69 From the beginning, this body of obligations 
was created in order to serve as the basis of a European civil code but as the 
work progressed, the purpose widened. 70 Today, the stated goal of the 
PECL is to provide a possible framework for European draft legislation. 71 
Article 1:101 p 2 in the finished product of the DCFR states that the 
principles “are intended to be applied as general rules of contract law in the 
European Union”. The PECL also declares to encourage development of a 
common European law operating within the framework’s field of 
application. Equally, it does not intend to present a full range of provisions 
that should be directly transformed into (binding) political legislation. 72  
 
The PECL was published by the CECL in three parts and extended the work 
on the regulatory framework to over two decades. The first project group, 
the 1982 Project Group, published the first set of rules in 1995. The 
provisions dealt mainly with performances, remedies and non-performances 
(breaches) regarding sales contracts. The second working group, the Second 
Commission on European Contract Law, started their project in 1992 and 
presented the result in 1999. These additional principles were said to 
supplement the first provisions published in 1995. The new rules concerned 
questions of validity, formation, interpretation and content of sales contracts 
as well as agent authorities. The third and last set of principles became 
available to the public in 2002 and was introduced as a continuation of the 
work completed in 1999. These addressed matters within contract law such 
as assignment of claims, debt, prescription and transfer of contracts. 73  
 
Inspiration for the PECL was said to be the CISG, which was published 
more than ten years earlier (see further in chapter 3.2.4). The PECL is 
however, unlike the CISG in that the former is considered soft law and 
therefore only binding to the parties if they decide to apply it to their 
contract. The PECL can be used when the parties agree to incorporate it into 
their contract or decide that the contract should be governed by its principles 
(article 101:1 p 2). The PECL can also be used if the parties agree that their 
contract should be governed by “general principles of law”, lex mercatoria74 
(or equivalent legislation) or when the parties have not made any choice of 
legislation (article 1:101 p 3 a-b). 
                                                
68 Lando, Introduction p. xv.  
69 Lando (2001), p. 2; Lando, Introduction p. xv.  
70 Lando, Preface p. x.  
71 Lando, Introduction p. xv.  
72 Lando, Introduction p. xvii.  
73 Lando, Preface p. xi and p. ix; Lando (2001), p. 2.  
74 Customary international trade law.  
 21 
3.2.2 The PICC (UNIDROIT Principles) 
The UNIDROIT project Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 
mainly referred to as the UNIDROIT Principles or the PICC, is a regulation 
often mentioned in connection with the PECL. Together, they intend to form 
a soft law framework for countries that want to create legislation within the 
area of international contract law. The PICC is however, like the PECL, an 
independent regulation in itself, providing a set of rules for parties to choose 
if they do not want either of their domestic laws (or any other state law) to 
govern their contract, but rather a “neutral” set of rules that is equally 
foreign to all parties involved.  75  
 
The PICC was presented in 1994 by the intergovernmental independent 
organization International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT). Established in 1926, the UNIDROIT statutes state that their 
aim is to study needs and methods for modernising, harmonising and co-
ordinating private law, in particular commercial law, in order to formulate 
uniform law instruments, principles and rules to achieve these objectives. 
Today the organization consists of 63 member states, including all major 
trade nations worldwide. 76  
 
The UNIDROIT initiated the PICC project because they aimed to establish 
and render a set of commercial contract rules serviceable for all countries, 
irrespective of differences in legal traditions and political, social and 
economic conditions. 77 The main objective for the framework is, similar to 
the PECL, to serve as a tool for interpreting and supplementing domestic 
law regulations. The principles are intended to be a vague model for future 
national and international legislation created within its scope. 78 
Comparatively, it can be concluded that while the PICC aims to regulate 
global transactions and to create harmonization within the field, the PECL 
focuses, to a greater extent, on European transactions and attempts to find a 
common core in current EU legislation in order to create its own acquis. 79  
 
The PICC principles have so far been published in three versions. The latest, 
from 2010, has added provisions regarding ailed contracts, illegality, 
conditions and plurality of obligors to the previous edition presented in 
2004. Following these additions, the PICC now targets problems of 
formation, validity, interpretation, performances, non-performances and 
general provisions regarding international commercial contracts. 80 Similar 
to the PECL, the PICC is applicable when the contracting parties agree to its 
applicability. The framework can also be used when the parties agree that 
                                                
75 Lando (2001), p. 3; http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (2013-
11-16).  
76 http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 (2013-11-11).  
77 The PICC, Introduction p. viii and p. xxiii.  
78 The PICC, recital 6-7.  
79 Conclusion from previous information in chapter 3.2.  
80 http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (2013-11-11). 
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their contract should be governed by “general principles of law” or the lex 
mercatoria. 81  
 
3.2.3 The DCFR 
A further central soft law framework containing international contract 
provisions is the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Grosso modo, 
the regulation was created by legal academics from the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code (SGECC). More specifically, was this completed by a 
research group within the SGECC named the Research Group on the 
existing EC Private Law (the Acquis group). 82 This assembly was formed 
following recent discussions in the EU regarding a future common contract 
law. The group’s assignment was to systematically examine community law 
in order to highlight common structures in current community private law, 
with the aim of turning this into EU law. 83 The project ended in 2008 with 
the group publishing their final product, the DCFR framework. 84 Sources of 
inspiration were said to be similar to then-existing regulations like the PECL 
and the PICC. 85  
 
In the DCFR’s introductory chapter, the framework is described as 
comprising principles, definitions and models of European private law 
common to all countries in the EU. 86 It is further stated that the DCFR is 
not a framework for contracting parties to refer to directly, but rather it 
should be employed as a possible model for creating new binding common 
frames of references (CFR). The Acquis group emphasizes that a CFR based 
on the DCFR should not directly copy its content; the DCFR should only aid 
in the creation process. Regardless of whether it is used as a basis for a CFR 
or not, the DCFR will still act as independent legislation and is able to 
function as research and educative material. 87 Several underlying principles 
of the framework are also mentioned, for example that it provides material 
for a discussion on fundamental law principles in Europe and that it 
explores the content of core aims of European private law. 88 
 
The DCFR is a comprehensive instrument with principles, definitions and 
models presented in ten books. 89 The provisions concern an entire legal 
spectrum from prescription and remedies for non-performances to 
provisions regarding rights on withdrawal, as well as non-discrimination 
rules. 90 The field of application for the DCFR is addressed in article 1:101, 
which states that that the provisions are intended to be used in relation to 
                                                
81 The PICC, Preamble introduction.  
82 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf (2013-11-12).  
83 http://www.acquis-group.org/ (2013-11-11).  
84 The DCFR, p. 7.  
85 The DCFR, p. 10.  
86 von Bar, pp. 3-4.  
87 von Bar, pp. 6-7.  
88 von Bar, pp. 10-13.  
89 The DCFR, p. 2.  
90 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf (2013-11-12).  
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contracts and other juridical acts, contractual and non-contractual rights, 
obligations and related property matters.   
 
The DCFR was, from the beginning, a privately funded project but, as the 
EU became progressively interested in the project’s results and intended to 
use its conclusions for creating a European civil law, the project itself 
became later financed by the Commission. Through this cooperation the 
DCFR was incorporated as an outline for what later came to be the CESL 
proposal (see further chapter 4). 91 
 
3.2.4 The CISG  
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, the CISG, is often said to be the most prosperous international 
substantive contract legislation in force today, as well as the most successful 
influence in trans-border commerce of all time92. 93 As of September 2013, a 
total of 80 states were parties to the legislation, including influential market 
actors like the United States, Canada, Australia, Russia and all EU member 
states except the United Kingdom, Portugal, Malta and Ireland. 94 
Altogether, the regulatory framework covers over two-thirds of the 
international world trade market. 95  
 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
created the CISG, signed in Vienna96 in 1980. 97 Through the mechanism of 
the CISG, the UNCITRAL wanted to construct a framework governing the 
rights for the buyer and the seller when completing international 
transactions. The UNCITRAL intended to facilitate international trade and 
to ensure its growth with the regulation in force. In effect, it would result in 
the legal situation being the same for all contracting parties no matter of 
their state of origin. 98  
 
The provisions in the CISG intend to cover the entire process of an 
international transaction, including rules on delivery of goods, obligations 
for the buyer, remedies for contract breaches by the seller, third party claims 
and more. 99 The CISG principally consists of provisions regarding sales 
contract formation, as well as obligations and rights of the parties arising 
from their contract. The CISG does not therefore regulate all situations that 
can potentially arise in the process of a transnational trade situation. Rules 
                                                
91 Perfetti in Alpa (ed.), pp. 49. See also chapter 4.1.  
92 This statement is far from unchallenged. See, for example, Dalhuisen, p. 305.  
93 See, for example, discussion by Meyer, p. 389.  
94 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (2013-11-12).  
95 Lookofsky (2008), p. 18. 
96 The CISG is occasionally referred to as The Vienna Convention.    
97 Dalhuisen, p. 299.  
98 Aksoy, pp. 460-462. 
99 The CISG, table of content.  
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on how to deal with third parties or provisions regarding contract validity 
are for example not embraced. 100  
 
In comparison with other transnational contractual regulatory frameworks 
concerning cross-border trade, such as the PECL and the PICC, the CISG 
differs in that it is not considered soft law. Its application is not dependent 
on the choice of the parties. The CISG applies by default as long as the 
contracting parties do not choose to opt-out, thus choosing other legislation 
instead. 101 The CISG is binding law in all countries that have ratified the 
legislation. For the convention to apply in cross-border sales transactions, 
the requirements for its application must be fulfilled in every individual case 
(see article 1). Predominantly, the sphere of application extends to contracts 
concerning the sale of goods between parties whose place of business are in 
different states, on the condition that all parties involved are contracting 
states (article 1.1). If they are not, private international rules must lead to the 
application of the CISG (article 1.1.a-b). Aside from this, the convention 
only applies to sales contracts regarding trade between professional traders. 
This is implied with the statement that contracts regarding the sale of goods 
bought for personal, family or household reasons are excluded from the 
legislation’s sphere of application (article 2a).  
 
3.3 EU provisions  
3.3.1 Adopted legislation  
Over the course of the last 30 years, there has been discourse in the EU 
surrounding the need for common sales and contract legislation dealing with 
cross-border trade within the Union. Despite this, no common contract law 
has yet been drafted. The DCFR has indeed come close however, aside from 
the EU’s processing of their work, it is not an EU project. 102 By contrast, 
the EU has adopted several directives regarding various aspects of contract 
law, most of them guaranteeing a minimum level of consumer protection 
within the common market. 103 A few directives not concerning consumer 
law are also in existence, for example the Late Payment Directive104. 105 It 
can therefore be concluded that contract law provisions regarding B2B 
contracts have only to a very small extent been subject to EU harmonization 
attempts. This area of law has not been of priority since B2B provisions 
usually are non-mandatory for all parties involved, unlike for consumer 
rules. 106 
 
                                                
100 Lookofsky, p. 24.  
101 The CESL, p. 5. Compare with information in chapters 3.2.1-3.2.3.  
102 Twigg-Flesner, p. 196.  
103 Twigg-Flesner, p. 10. 
104 Directive 2001/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions.  
105 Lilleholt, p. 4.    
106 Twigg-Flesner, pp. 10-11. 
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Regarding the common sales and contract legislation that do exist, directives 
currently in force include the Directive on Distance Selling of Financial 
Services 107 , the Directive on Consumer Credit 108  and the Directive 
Regarding Unfair Commercial Practices 109 . Most of them demand a 
minimum standard of harmonization, meaning that member states can retain 
or adopt domestic provisions that are more favourable to consumers. 
Contrastingly, the Consumer Credit directive necessitates maximum 
harmonization. Domestic legislation cannot therefore be more or less 
favourable than the directive’s provisions. 110  Furthermore, the current 
directives only deal with specific aspects of contract law. In such cases, 
either only one type of contract is dealt with (vertical application) or they 
are all dealt with. However, in the latter case, only a particular issue is 
covered (horizontal application). This means that each directive has a 
narrow area of application and the harmonizing effect within the common 
market is thereby also limited.111 One of the few directives with a broader 
scope is the Consumer Rights Directive112. Promulgated in 2011, its aim was 
to merge four existing directives regarding consumer rights within the EU. 
113 The regulation has since its enforcement met severe criticism however, 
mainly surrounding the inappropriateness of allowing the EU to have 
exclusive competence in deciding the level of consumer protection within 
the Union. 114 
 
The EU has so far only used directives in order to harmonize contract law 
within the Union, however this way of working has been criticized as 
ineffective. Development has nonetheless turned and today the EU 
legislative powers focus on creating a freestanding European contract law, 
in response to remarks from critics. Ultimately this development can be seen 
in the CESL proposal. 115 
 
3.3.2 Supportive provisions 
Aside from creating directives within the area of contract law, the EU has 
made other legislative moves in order to facilitate the formation of a 
common contract law within the Union. The TFEU contains, as earlier 
presented (see chapter 2.1), provisions stating the EU’s aims to guarantee 
the free movement of goods, capital, services and people within the 
                                                
107 Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services.  
108 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers.  
109 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in 
the internal market.  
110 Lilleholt, p. 4.  
111 Twigg-Flesner, pp. 124-125.  
112 Directive 2011/83/EU on Consumer Rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Text with EEA relevance. 
113 Lilleholt, p. 4.  
114 Lilleholt, p. 4; Smits, pp. 9-10.    
115 DiMatteo, pp. 231-232.  
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common market. These rules have, in turn, resulted in the formation of 
domestic laws in accordance with these aims. National contract law in 
member states cannot result in a violation of these stated principles116. The 
free movement provisions are thereby indirectly supporting cross-border 
activity and acting as a barrier to the creation of future trade obstacles. 117  
 
The EU’s competence to create common contract legislation is usually 
addressed as originating from article 114 in the TFEU. Whether or not this 
article actually has the capacity to be the legal basis for adopting a common 
European contract law, or single directives on the subject, has been debated. 
118 Some commentators go as far as to state that the EU in general has no 
jurisdiction in private law formation, and that the Union only uses article 
114 as a backdoor to add legitimacy to legislation within this area of law. 119 
Article 114 asserts that:  
 
“The European Parliament and the Council shall […] adopt the measures for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.” 120  
 
The provision aspires to be used not only for measures that intend to 
establish the internal market, but also for measures related to its functioning, 
for example reducing or removing competitive disadvantages. Article 114 
has operated as a legal basis for the majority of the contract law provisions 
existing today within EU law. 121 Imperative for discussion has been the 
limits of the article’s authorizing powers, for example if it can serve as the 
legal basis for an optional regulatory framework. Such regulation does not 
supplement nor replace national law, effectively alluding that there 
technically will be no act of harmonization in existing domestic laws. 122 
 
 
                                                
116 This process of striking out national laws that are incompatible with the objectives of the 
EU is often referred to as ”negative harmonization”, contrary harmonization through the 
implementation of directives in domestic legislation (called “positive harmonization”). See 
further Twigg-Flesner, p. 23.  
117 Twigg-Flesner, p. 23.  
118 See, for example, Heidemann, pp. 1121-1126 or Staudenmayer in Alpa (ed.), pp. 21-23.  
119 Dalhuisen, p. 314.  
120 The TFEU, article 14.  
121 Twigg-Flesner, p. 30.  
122 Hesselink, p. 2.  
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4 CESL – Proposal for a 
Common European Sales 
Law 
4.1 Background  
On October 11, 2011 the Commission presented their proposal for a 
common European sales law, named the Common European Sales Law123 
(the CESL). 124 The preparatory work had however begun almost ten years 
earlier. The Commission launched what is arguably the first embryo of a 
common sales law for the European market in July 2001, when suggesting a 
contract law framework125 with the aim of removing obstacles to cross-
border trade. The communication generated discourse regarding how the EU 
should develop their work in the area of common contract law. However, 
nothing concrete was decided. 126 
 
Following the presentation of the DCFR in 2008 (see chapter 3.2.3) the 
Union, in 2010, considered legislative provisions incorporating a partially 
pre-existing common contract law within the EU. The Commission decided 
to create an expert group127 mandated to form the grounding of a common 
EU contract law based on parts of the DCFR considered relevant for the 
project. Their opinion was that if the principles were updated and the expert 
group could fill in lacunae, the DCFR could lead to the establishment of a 
new European contract law instrument. This required however, that the 
content of this instrument was to be compatible with already existing 
regulatory frameworks within the area such as the CISG, the PICC and the 
PECL. 128  
 
The same year that the expert group began to process the DCFR principles, 
the Commission launched their Green Paper 129 . The report presented 
various opinions on how progress could be achieved within the area of a 
common European contract law, all with the purpose of strengthening the 
internal market. 130 Three of the suggestions discussed the creation of an 
optional law in the matter. 131 The report also stated that any future common 
                                                
123 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law, COM(2011) 635 final. 
124 Graf von Westphalen in Alpa (ed.), p. 11.  
125 COM (2001) 398, 11.7.2001.  
126 The CESL, p. 4; Whittaker pp. 579-580.  
127 Participants in the Expert Group on European Contract Law: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert-group_en.pdf (2013-12-05).  
128 Dalhuisen, p. 299; Perfetti in Alpa (ed.), p. 49.  
129 The Green Paper from the Commission on policy options for progress towards a 
European Contract Law for consumers and businesses, COM(2010) 348 final.  
130 The CESL, pp. 4-5; Berlinguer in Alpa (ed.), p. 45.  
131 Educate, p. 14. 
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contract law should target both B2B and B2C contracts. 132 Consumer 
contracts were therefore implicitly included, despite criticism that earlier 
attempts by the EU to harmonize consumer contract law had been subjected 
to (see chapter 3.3.1). In June 2011, the Parliament responded to the Green 
Paper by proposing a resolution133 where they expressed their support for 
the creation of an instrument able, not only, to improve the functioning of 
the inner market but also one available to both consumers and traders. 134 
 
In conjunction with the launch of the Green Paper, the Commission 
presented their Feasibility study for a future instrument in European 
Contract Law135. This study is arguably the document most similar to the 
completed CESL proposal made by the Commission136. Once the Feasibility 
study was revised and the Parliament had expressed their support, the 
document was lastly presented by the Commission as a finished draft, in 
form of the CESL. 137 
 
Regarding the CESL today, negotiations are currently being held between 
member states as to whether the proposal should be adopted or not. The 
debate has initially centred around the question of whether there is a need 
for this kind of legislation at all, rather than discussions surrounding the 
content of the proposal. 138 The Legal Affairs Committee at the Parliament 
has, during 2013, arranged a number of events in order to allow experts to 
express their opinion on the CESL. Several hearings and debates have taken 
place. 139 Opinions on the proposal have also varied among the national 
parliaments. Member states such as Italy and Sweden are in favour of an 
entry into force, while others like Germany and the United Kingdom are 
more sceptical. 140 Both the Parliament and the Council must approve the 
proposal in order for it to enter into force. The Commission’s original goal 
was that the EU would reach an agreement regarding the CESL in 2012. But 
as of the present day, none of the EU bodies have given it the green light, 
render the future for the CESL exceptionally uncertain and difficult to 
predict. 141  
 
                                                
132 The CESL, pp. 4-5; Berlinguer in Alpa (ed.), p. 45. 
133 European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on policy options for progress towards a 
European Contract Law for consumers and businesses 2011/2013. 
134 The CESL, p. 5.  
135 A European contract law for consumers and businesses: Publication of the results of the 
feasibility study carried out by the Expert Group on European contract law for stakeholders' 
and legal practitioners' feedback. 
136 It is stated that the substantive provisions in the CESL (Annex 1) are nearly identical to 
the content of the Feasibility study. See Hesselink, p. 1. 
137 Aksoy, p. 459; Heidemann, p. 1121.   
138 Meyer, p. 390; Prunbauer-Glaser in Alpa (ed.), p. 4.  
139 Berlinguer in Alpa (ed.), p. 45.  
140 Lilleholt, p. 1.   
141 Lilleholt, p. 1; Meyer p. 390.   
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4.2 Purposes of the framework   
In the CESL explanatory memorandum (see further chapter 4.4), the 
Commission states that the overall purpose of the proposal is to improve the 
establishment and functioning of the common market by providing a 
uniform set of contract law rules. 142 It is stated that disparity in contract 
laws between member states hinder cross-border exports and imports, 
because market actors feel uncertain of which rules apply and what their 
content is. These legal dissimilarities result in complexity and create 
obstacles such as unexpected, and often increased, transportation costs. 
Such adverse effects will in turn inhibit both traders and consumers; traders 
who wish to expand within the common market and consumers who wish to 
enjoy benefits from engaging in cross-border trade. Through the 
enforcement of the CESL, a range of autonomous rules regarding cross-
border trade will be available within the EU, which will benefit both 
consumers and traders. 143  
 
Regarding traders, the proposal states that its provisions only cover B2B 
transactions where at least one of the parties is a small trader. The purpose 
of this criterion is to protect minor businesses and embolden them to engage 
in cross-border trade. Small-sized businesses normally have a more limited 
knowledge about other legal systems than their own. At the same time they 
are more often, compared with their larger competitors, forced to accept that 
a foreign law governs their contract if the other contracting party is located 
abroad. With this lack of knowledge, entering into a foreign market will 
deepen legal complexity and increase risks for small enterprises. It will most 
likely also incur additional costs, as the trader will need to examine the 
content of the foreign law. Further costs will also arise when the parties 
must negotiate the applicable law. The costs generated through the process, 
negotiating and ascertaining the content of a foreign law, can often exceed 
the total profit of the cross-border deal. This is especially the case for minor 
businesses. 144  
 
The Commission stresses that those consequences will, in the long run, 
hinder the exercise of fundamental rights within the EU, for example the 
freedom to provide goods and services. 145 With the enforcement of the 
CESL, smaller traders will be given a more advantageous option to 
domestic laws. If the CESL governs a contract, there will no longer be a 
need for parties to research the substance of foreign domestic laws, with the 
exception of various less important cases where the CESL does not cover. It 
is for this reason that a smaller trader will reduce both his/her costs and risks 
in cross-border transactions. 146 
 
                                                
142 The CESL, p. 4.  
143 The CESL, pp. 2-4 and p. 11.  
144 The CESL, p. 4 and recital 2.  
145 The CESL, recital 1.  
146 The CESL, p. 4 and recital 8.  
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Furthermore, the Commission explains that consumers will be favoured in 
several ways by the CESL. Missed opportunities for transnational trade 
within the Union not only has negative effects for traders but also for 
consumers, since less cross-border commerce will result in fewer imports 
and less competitiveness among traders. This will further lead to a more 
limited choice of products and higher prices for consumers in all member 
states. 147 
 
The Commission states that consumers tend to avoid buying products or 
services abroad as they feel uncertain of their rights and what the contents of 
the foreign rules are that might apply to the purchase. This is the case even 
if today, consumers within the common market have the right to invoke 
mandatory consumer protection rules existing in their domestic laws, if 
indeed any do exist (article 6 Rome I). 148 The CESL states that with its 
implementation, there will be no longer need to identify mandatory 
consumer protection rules in the consumer’s domestic law. This is because 
the CESL contains a fully harmonized structure for consumer protection, 
providing a high protection standard throughout the whole EU. For some 
member states this will result in a raised standard, for others it will make no 
difference. 149 The harmonization will also lead to a less complex legal 
situation for traders involved in transactions with consumers, since traders 
will not need to examine the consumer’s laws in order to establish the 
existence of any mandatory provisions. 150 Negotiations on the applicable 
law regarding B2C contracts 151  may also be less complex when the 
contracting parties have the opportunity to agree to use the CESL; a 
regulatory framework equally accessible to all actors involved. 152 
 
4.3 Scope of application   
4.3.1 An opt-in procedure 
There are numerous prerequisites required for using the CESL. First and 
foremost, the CESL is an optional instrument; emerging from the proposal’s 
article 3. This means that the parties must choose, opt-in to, the CESL to 
make it applicable and to govern their contract. This choice must always be 
within the freedom of contract or within the freedom of choice of law 
granted to the parties. 153 The rules of the CESL will thereby only apply if 
the parties actively opt-in to the regulation in each individual case. 154 
 
                                                
147 The CESL, p. 3 and recital 4.  
148 The CESL, recital 3-4.  
149 The CESL, recital 11-12.  
150 The CESL, recital 3.  
151 Can be the case if the consumer wants another law than his/her home state’s to be 
applicable. See article 6.2 in the Rome I, chapter 2.2.1.   
152 Compare with the CESL, p. 2.   
153 Fogt, p. 89.  
154 The CESL, recital 8. 
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The regular definition of an opt-in legislation is that it by operation of law 
(ipso jure) replaces existing provisions within its scope of application. This 
means that if the contracting parties choose the CESL to govern their 
contract, neither of their respective national laws applies in areas covered by 
the CESL. Outside of these areas, the optional regulatory framework will 
operate parallel with domestic laws and other provisions. 155 For an opt-in 
instrument to take effect, the contracting parties must manifestly 
demonstrate their will for this to occur. This must be achieved in three parts: 
1) the parties must have knowledge of the existence and the content of the 
optional instrument 2) both parties must, based on that knowledge, express 
their choice to apply the optional law and 3) a bilateral consensus regarding 
the above must prevail, meaning that the parties need to have agreed to opt-
in to the instrument and decided to apply it to their contract.156 
 
The CESL establishes a two-step procedure for opting-in specifically to its 
provisions. In article 8.2, it is stated that the choice to allow the CESL to 
govern a contract must be agreed upon in an “explicit statement which is 
separate from the statement indicating the agreement to conclude a 
contract”. This requires that the parties in a first step agree to the contract 
and then secondly agree to subject the contract to the CESL. 157 Effectively, 
this adds an additional layer to the requirements of “regular” opt-in 
instruments158. The reason for this is stated in the CESL to be a procedure 
chiefly in place to draw consumers’ attention to the fact that their agreement 
is mainly governed by the CESL, and not by their own national law. 159 
 
4.3.2 Additional prerequisites   
Even if the requirements for opt-in are met (in accordance with those 
previously stated in chapter 4.3.1), the CESL will only apply to three types 
of contracts: contracts for the sale of goods, contracts for the supply of 
digital content and contracts for provision of services related to either of 
them (article 5). More specific definitions of these enumerated contract 
types are found in article 2. A sales contract is here defined as: 
 
“[a]ny contract under which the trader ('the seller') transfers or undertakes to transfer 
the ownership of the goods to another person ('the buyer'), and the buyer pays or 
undertakes to pay the price thereof” 160 
 
In this case the seller must be a trader, while the buyer can either be a trader 
or a consumer. The definition includes contracts regarding the sale of goods 
that not yet have been manufactured or produced. Excluded are contracts for 
sale on execution or contracts that otherwise involve the exercise of public 
                                                
155 Fogt, pp. 88-89.  
156 Fogt, pp. 90-91.  
157 See the CESL, article 8 and recital 22.  
158 In other words, the CESL cannot be agreed upon in standard contract terms.  
159 The CESL, recital 22.  
160 The CESL, article 2 point K.  
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authority. 161 The CESL provides no classification for contracts for the 
supply of digital content. The definition for digital content however, can be 
found in article 2: 
 
 “[d]ata which are produced and supplied in digital form, whether or not according 
to the buyer's specifications, including video, audio, picture or written digital 
content, digital games, software and digital content which makes it possible to 
personalise existing hardware or software” 162 
 
The classification excludes financial services (including online banking 
services), legal or financial advice provided electronically, electronic 
healthcare, electronic communication services and networks (incorporating 
associated facilities and services), gambling, creation of new digital content 
as well as the amendment of existing digital content. 163 The third category 
regarding related services is also defined in article 2: 
 
“[a]ny service related to goods or digital content, such as installation, maintenance, 
repair or any other processing, provided by the seller of the goods or the supplier of 
the digital content under the sales contract, the contract for the supply of digital 
content or a separate related service contract which was concluded at the same time 
as the sales contract or the contract for the supply of digital content” 164 
 
Transport services, training services, telecommunications support and 
financial services are however excluded. 165 
 
Contracts found outside of the CESL scope of application are mixed-
purpose contracts and contracts linked to consumer credit. A mixed-purpose 
contract is a contract that includes elements other than the sale of goods, 
supply of digital content or any related service (according to their 
definitions in article 5) (article 6.1). An example is if the contract contains 
an agreement for lease of goods or for a gift166. Contracts linked to 
consumer credit exist when a trader grants or promises to grant a consumer 
credit as a deferred payment, loan or similar financial arrangement (article 
6.2).  
 
A further requirement for the application of the CESL is that the contract 
must be of cross-border nature, meaning that a minimum of two of the 
contracting parties must have their habitual residence in different countries 
(article 4.2). Additionally, at least one of the parties must have their habitual 
residence in a member state. There is, however, no provision requiring all 
contracting parties to be located in a member state. This renders the 
proposal applicable in far more situations than trade within the common 
market and between EU member states. 167 
 
                                                
161 The CESL, article 2 point K.  
162 The CESL, article 2 point J.  
163 The CESL, article 2 point J.  
164 The CESL, article 2 point M.  
165 The CESL, article 2 point M.  
166 Examples from Schulze, p. 51.   
167 Schulze, pp. 35-37.  
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The possibility of employing the CESL to govern a contract is also limited 
to the status of the contracting parties (article 7). Parties to a contract can 
either be a trader and a consumer or alternatively all parties may be traders, 
as long as at least one of them is a SME, small or medium-sized enterprise. 
Article 7.2 defines a SME as a company that employs fewer than 250 people 
and that has an annual turnover below 50 million euros or an annual balance 
sheet not exceeding 43 million euros in total (or an equal amount in 
corresponding currency). 168 There is, however, one exception to the status 
requirement. Member states can themselves decide to make the CESL 
applicable to contracts between traders in cases where none of them qualify 
as a SME. The same exception can apply to the requirement for a cross-
border contract. In other words, member states can also make the CESL 
apply to entirely national contracts. 169 
 
4.4 Structure and content overview  
The structure of the CESL is divided into three main parts. 170 Before the 
first part, a so-called explanatory memorandum exists. Here, the 
Commission sets out and explains the purpose and scope of the proposal, 
presents provisions for agreeing to use the framework and the consequences 
of using it, for example in relation to domestic laws etc. 171 Following, the 
first part of the proposal is presented. It is a preamble, containing of 37 
points (recitals) and 16 articles that informs the reader about the CESL and 
its content. For example, it is here explained the proposal’s benefits for 
traders and consumers. 172 These recitals and articles are commonly referred 
to as the chapeau rules173 of the framework. 174 
 
The second part of the proposal, normally stated to be the Annex I, is where 
the CESL’s substantive provisions are found introducing the contract and 
sales law set-up. Third part of the CESL is the Annex II. This part provides a 
standard information notice about the CESL and is a summary of the key 
consumer rights enumerated in the proposal. 175 
 
Regarding the content of the substantive regulations in Annex I (normally 
referred to as the “CESL rules”), the Commission states in the preamble that 
the CESL intends to cover all matters of contract law that are of practical 
relevance during the life cycle of a contract type falling within the scope of 
the regulation. 176 This is specified to include provisions on:  
 
                                                
168 See the CESL, article 7.  
169 Lilleholt, p. 5.  
170 The CESL, p. 11; Fogt, p. 87.  
171 The CESL, pp. 2-21.  Magnus, p. 3.  
172 The CESL, pp. 14-21.  
173 A French saying.  
174 Fogt, p. 87.  
175 Fogt, p. 87.  
176 The CESL, p. 4 and recital 26. 
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“[p]re-contractual information duties, the conclusion of a contract including formal 
requirements, the right of withdrawal and its consequences, avoidance of the 
contract resulting from a mistake, fraud, threats or unfair exploitation and the 
consequences of such avoidance, interpretation, the contents and effects of a 
contract, the assessment and consequences of unfairness of contract terms, 
restitution after avoidance and termination and the prescription and preclusion of 
rights.” 177 
 
The CESL asserts that it also aims to harmonize the sanctions available in 
cases of a contract breach and duties that can arise under its application. 178 
As such, the proposal’s intention is evidently not to cover all stages of the 
contracting process. For example, there are no provisions regulating 
questions on power of attorney, nor any rules on offsetting. 179  
 
On a closer consideration of Annex 1, it consists of eight provision 
categories and two appendices. The eight categories are divided into the 
following: 1) introductory provisions (for example principles binding on the 
parties such as the good faith requirement) 2) rules on making a binding 
contract 3) rules on assessing what a contract is 4) obligations and remedies 
for the parties to a sales contract 5) obligations and remedies for the parties 
to a related services contract 6) damages and interests 7) restitution and 8) 
prescription. Appendix 1 contains model instructions regarding withdrawal; 
instructions that the trader must provide the consumer before an agreement 
is made between the parties if the agreement regards distance selling or if it 
is an off-premises contract. Appendix 2 considers the same issue as the first 
appendix, but provides a model withdrawal form for the consumer affected 
by the purchase. 180  
 
 
                                                
177 The CESL, recital 26. 
178 The CESL, recital 26.  
179 Compare with content of the regulatory frameworks presented in chapter 3.2.   
180 The CESL, p. 13.  
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5 Central Conflict of Law 
Issues if the CESL Enters 
Into Force 
5.1 Introduction  
Since the CESL came up on the EU agenda, several criticisms have been 
presented in the legal discourse regarding the proposal. 181 For example, it 
has been questioned if there is a need for another cross-border trade 
legislation when similar frameworks, like the CISG, already exist. 182 
Another assessment has been that the EU is acting outwith its legislative 
competence by developing such a framework within sales law, since this 
violates the established principle of subsidiarity183 recognized within EU 
law. The fact that the proposal has been conceptualized as optional has 
raised concerns that article 114 TFEU cannot be considered a valid legal 
basis for the implementation of such legislation (see further on this debate in 
chapter 3.3.2). 184  
 
Criticism of the CESL has also concerned the potential law conflicts that 
may arise if the proposal becomes adopted in its current form. 185 The need 
to consider the CESL in the light of private international law is stated within 
its objectives. This is necessary due to the framework only applying to 
cross-border transactions. This means that more than one body of law will 
be involved, which forces conflict rules to decide which one that applies. 186 
In the CESL explanatory memorandum, the Commission present their view 
on how the proposal intends to interact with existing conflict rules in the 
EU:  
 
“The Rome I Regulation and Rome II Regulation will continue to apply and will be 
unaffected by the proposal. It will still be necessary to determine the applicable law 
for cross-border contracts. This will be done by the normal operation of the Rome I 
Regulation. It can be determined by the parties themselves (Article 3 of the Rome I 
Regulation) and, if they do not do so, this will be done on the basis of the default 
rules in Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. As regards consumer contracts, under 
the conditions of Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation, if the parties have not 
chosen the applicable law, that law is the law of the habitual residence of the 
consumer […] This agreement to use the Common European Sales Law is a choice 
between two different sets of sales law within the same national law and does 
                                                
181 See, for example, Dalhuisen, p. 299.  
182 Ortiz & Perales, p. 243.  
183 The principle is found in the TFEU, article 5. The article states that decisions must be 
made as close to the citizens as possible, meaning that the EU should not use its legislative 
powers to achieve something that can be done via domestic laws. See definition: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm (2013-12-06).  
184 Heidemann, pp. 1121-1123.  
185 Mak, p. 328.  
186 Sánchez-Lorenzo, p. 191.  
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therefore not amount to, and must not be confused with, the previous choice of the 
applicable law within the meaning of private international law rules.“ 187 
 
At first, the solution seems uncomplicated. The Rome I and the Rome II188 
(together further referred to as the “Rome Regulations”) will continue to 
apply to situations that fall within the scope of the CESL. The relationship 
between the Rome Regulations and the CESL will be identical to their 
relationship with domestic laws. The Rome Regulations will thereby solve 
law collisions involving the CESL whenever its application overlaps with 
other bodies of law. 189 The description of the relationship between the 
CESL and the Rome Regulations can however be considered as 
oversimplifying the solution to potential law conflicts. Adding new 
legislation to an already well-regulated and complex area of law like 
international trade is not without complications. 190 Not only must the 
CESL’s relationship with current conflict rules be established, but also the 
way in which it will interact with substantive law provisions that it may 
collide with, and where conflict rules cannot solve the issue. Examples of 
such provisions are mandatory rules, including consumer protection rules, 
and international trade legislation. In relation to these provisions, conflicts 
are likely to occur if there are no clear guidelines in the proposal to solve the 
collisions. 191 
 
Regarding the relationship between the CESL and current conflict rules, 
there is no further explanation from the Commission of how these relate to 
each other, apart from what has been presented. 192 In addition to this, the 
proposal has outlined how it intends to relate to substantive provisions that 
it may collide with in vague terms. 193 The Commission appears to fail to 
attach sufficient weight to the potential law conflict issues arising when 
applying the CESL. What the proposal states, is simply that conflict rules in 
force will be unaffected by the CESL and that this circumstance will solve 
all subsequent law conflicts with other substantive provisions. No problems 
will arise. 194 Critics have, however, raised issues with such a position. 195 
 
The debate regarding the CESL and the law conflict issues it potentially can 
cause has, so far, mainly concentrated upon three issues. The first regards 
the choice and enforcement of the CESL via current conflict rules, mainly 
the Rome Regulations (chapter 5.2). The second is the relation between the 
                                                
187 The CESL, p. 6. 
188 In most cases where the CESL is chosen, as will be further shown, the applicable law 
will be determined by the Rome I. Nevertheless, there are some pre-contractual provisions 
in the CESL and therefore the Rome II can also become the current conflict rules. Problems 
connected to the Rome II have been discussed, even if not to a great extent. Therefore, the 
Rome II can be relevant to keep in mind regarding the following issues.  
189 Heidemann, p. 1127.  
190 Dalhuisen, pp. 299-301 and p. 303.  
191 Sánchez-Lorenzo, pp. 191-192. 
192 See previous citation from the CESL, p. 6.  
193 See following discussions in chapters 5.3-5.4.  
194 See previous citation from the CESL, p. 6.   
195 See following discussions in chapters 5.3-5.4 
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CESL and mandatory law provisions (chapter 5.3), while the third concerns 
how the CESL and the CISG will relate to each other (chapter 5.4). 196 
 
5.2 Problem I: Application via the Rome 
Regulations 
5.2.1 Detour due to legal status 
Within the field of private international law, the CESL can be categorized as 
a framework of special substantive rules. The provisions are substantive, as 
opposed to procedural, in the way that they concern material rules 
applicable within the scope of the CESL, and special in the sense that they 
are an alternative to domestic laws that otherwise would apply. 197 The 
aspect of the CESL explanatory memorandum relating to its relationship 
with existing EU conflict rules, previously presented in chapter 5.1, 
continues with the following:  
 
“The Common European Sales Law will be a second contract law regime within the 
national law of each Member State. Where the parties have agreed to use the 
Common European Sales Law, its rules will be the only national rules applicable for 
matters falling within its scope. Where a matter falls within the scope of the 
Common European Sales Law, there is thus no scope for the application of any other 
national rules. This agreement to use the Common European Sales Law is a choice 
between two different sets of sales law within the same national law and does 
therefore not amount to, and must not be confused with, the previous choice of the 
applicable law within the meaning of private international law rules.” 198 
 
This excerpt describes the form of the CESL. This form is further clarified 
via a statement located within the preamble to the CESL:  
 
“[t]he agreement to use the Common European Sales Law should be a choice 
exercised within the scope of the respective national law which is applicable 
pursuant to [the Rome I Regulation], … [the Rome II Regulation], or any other 
relevant conflict of law rule.” 199  
 
From the above, it can be concluded that the provisions in the CESL are not 
independent substantive rules. They have to be chosen by the Rome 
Regulations (or other relevant conflict rules) in order to apply, just like 
national laws have to be in cases where several of them are applicable, for 
example in cross-border transaction. If the Rome I is the conflict regulation 
that applies, the choice of law is done either by article 3 or article 4, 
depending on whether a choice of law has been expressed by the parties or 
not (see chapter 2.2.1). 200 The Rome Regulations state that if the parties 
                                                
196 See Conte in Alpa (ed.), pp. 68-74. Here, these three specific issues are stated to be the 
most central. 
197 Sánchez-Lorenzo, p. 192. Compare with Lookofsky, p. 7.  
198 The CESL, p. 6.  
199 The CESL, recital 10.  
200 Sánchez-Lorenzo, p. 192; Bisping, pp. 2-3.  
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have chosen a law, then that law is applicable (article 3 in the Rome I, 
article 14 in Rome II). Accordingly, no issue seems to exist if parties have 
chosen to let the CESL govern their contract. Their decision will always be 
valid and take effect via conflict provisions. 201  
 
However, the CESL is also a dependent regulatory framework in a way that 
domestic laws are not. Unlike for domestic laws, the CESL cannot be an 
option of choice for conflict rules. The previously presented citation from 
the CESL asserts that it will be a “second contract law regime within the 
national law of each Member State”202. This means that the proposal will 
have the status of an optional legislation within the national law that is 
chosen by conflict rules. 203 The relationship between the national law and 
the CESL is stated to be that when the CESL applies, the domestic law 
cannot be validly applied within the same scope. 204 
 
It can thereby be concluded that the CESL applies via the Rome Regulations 
and via domestic legislation. This process is called the two-step application 
procedure205. 206 The latter step, to apply the CESL via domestic legislation, 
inhibits the creation of a 29th European contract law regime, a law that 
would exist parallel with the current 28 domestic contract laws. Instead, the 
CESL will, if it enters into force, create an alternative to each member 
state’s contract law. The proposal will operate as an aspect of the domestic 
law that the Rome Regulations, or other conflict rules, consider to be 
applicable. Therefore, the CESL should not be seen as a piece of 
international law. Considering this, the CESL is often referred to and 
categorized as a 2nd contract law regime when its form of legislation is 
discussed. 207 
 
The characterisation of the CESL as an alternative aspect of domestic laws 
allows conclusions to be drawn as to how potential law conflicts would be 
solved under existing conflict rules. The Commission has not expressly 
considered the potential law conflict ramifications following such a 
characterisation. 208 
 
5.2.2 Third state influence and other issues  
An issue that arises due to the fact that the CESL applies via conflict rules is 
the involvement of a third state, a non-EU member state, in a situation 
                                                
201 Whittaker, pp. 588-589. 
202 See previous citation from the CESL, p. 6. 
203 The CESL, p. 4; Fogt, pp. 113.  
204 See previous citation from the CESL, p. 6: “Where a matter falls within the scope of the 
Common European Sales Law, there is thus no scope for the application of any other 
national rules”. 
205 To clarify the steps: 1) The Rome Regulations make a domestic law applicable 2) This 
chosen domestic law makes the CESL applicable. See Fogt, p. 113.  
206 Fogt, pp. 112-113. 
207 Conte in Alpa (ed.), p. 68.  
208 See following discussions in chapter 5.2.2.  
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where the parties have agreed to let the CESL govern their contract. 209 A 
prerequisite for the CESL to apply is that only one of the contracting parties 
has his/her habitual residence in a member state (see prerequisites for 
application of the CESL in chapter 4.3.2). There is neither any requirement 
that the subject of the contract is performed within or delivered to a state 
within the EU. The country that is considered to be the one with the closest 
connection to the contract can therefore in many situations be a third state. 
210   
 
First of all, the parties can choose to involve a third state211, for example in 
accordance with article 3 in the Rome I, when applying the CESL. The 
chosen third state law will then govern all matters outwith the scope of 
CESL. Furthermore, a third state-involvement can occur without such 
agreement. An example of the latter situation is when the contracting parties 
have not chosen a domestic law to govern their contract, but agreed to use 
the CESL. Here, article 4 in the Rome I (see chapter 2.2.1) can lead to the 
application of a third state law, which will be the result if the contract’s 
“main connection” is considered to be in a third state. 212 Another situation 
is if the contracting parties have agreed on a member state’s law to be 
applicable along with the CESL, but this agreement for some reason has not 
met the conditions within article 3 of the Rome I. The choice of law will 
then not be valid, which will lead to the use of article 4. This determination 
under article 4 could result in the law of a third state being chosen as 
applicable. 213  
 
There are, as outlined above, a variety of situations where a third state can 
be involved in situations where the CESL applies. The question that 
remains, however, is why this involvement is a problem. Critics in the 
academic discourse have raised concerns regarding what the outcome will 
be if the Rome Regulations, due to a third state involvement, are not chosen 
as the applicable conflict rules within the scope of the CESL. Although, 
even if the Rome Regulations are applicable, it would not solve all potential 
conflicts. 214  
 
The first mentioned situation, and the resulting issues, has been emphasized 
through the following example. In the example, a consumer and a trader 
have agreed on a deal and decided to let the CESL govern their contract. 
They have also agreed on a member state law to apply to rule the issues not 
covered by the CESL, for example Italian law. With this, no third state 
should have a chance to become involved (at least not because of article 4 in 
the Rome I). The trader has his business located in a member state, for 
example France, and the consumer purchases goods that are to be delivered 
                                                
209 Fogt, pp. 128-129.  
210 The CESL, article 4. Compare with the Rome I, articles 3-4.  
211 See example in Sánchez-Lorenzo, p. 199.   
212 Sánchez-Lorenzo, pp. 198-199; Whittaker, pp. 588-589.  
213 See example from Sánchez-Lorenzo p. 199 in comparison with prerequisites for a choice 
of law according to the Rome I.    
214 See following discussions.  
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to an address in a member state, for example Germany. The consumer 
resides occasionally on this German address and he intends to store the 
purchased goods here. The parties’ agreement to use the CESL in this 
situation seems valid. It regards a consumer purchase, the situation is cross-
border, the purchase is made within the EU and all parties appear to be 
coming from EU countries (even if the last is not a requirement for the 
CESL to apply). No third state or third state law seems to be involved. 
Although, the consumer’s permanent address is located in Switzerland, a 
third state, and this is where he is domiciled. The consumer has not declared 
this circumstance to the trader, since the information has no practical 
relevance for the purchase. However, according to the Commission, the 
applicability of the CESL must be determined through current law conflict 
rules (either the Rome Regulations or other) and not by the proposal itself. 
Jurisdiction must be given to a forum with jurisdiction to apply its conflict 
rules. Normally, this is done in accordance with the lex fori principle215. 
Although, since this case regards a consumer jurisdiction is normally based 
upon the domicile of the consumer (in this case article 15.1.c and 16.1-2 in 
the Lugano Convention 216 ). This will, in the example, result in the 
application of Swiss private international law. The conflict resolution 
frameworks within Switzerland are made up of provisions different than the 
Rome Regulations. Here, the applicable law is the consumer’s domestic law. 
There are no exceptions stated from this rule, even if the parties have agreed 
to apply another law to their contract (in this case a member state law). With 
this, the parties’ choice to let the CESL govern their contract is void. 217 
 
The stated example is, however, a rarity. In the majority of circumstances, 
as highlighted by the proposal218, the applicable conflict rules for a situation 
governed by the CESL will be the Rome Regulations. But, issues still arise 
as to the influence of a third state even if the Rome Regulations are applied. 
In the CESL, the Commission declares that: “The Common European Sales 
Law will be a second contract law regime within the national law of each 
member state”219. Accordingly, the situation where the involvement of a 
third state will cause the Rome Regulations to apply a third state’s law to a 
contract that already is governed by CESL, is worthy of consideration. In 
such a situation, the CESL cannot apply. The proposal is only in force 
within member states’ laws. The lack of reasoning on this issue is 
surprising, especially considering the opinions of many that such an issue 
appears “obvious”. 220 
 
                                                
215 Jurisdiction is given to the country of the court that the event was brought to.  
216 88/592/EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, done at Lugano on 16 September 1988. 
217 Eidenmuller, p. 8.  
218 See the CESL, p. 6: ”The Rome I Regulation and Rome II Regulation will continue to 
apply […] It will still be necessary to determine the applicable law […] This will be done by 
the normal operation of the Rome I Regulation.”.  
219 A different solution is not possible. The EU has no competence to make the CESL a 2nd 
contract law regime within a non-member state’s law.  
220 Fogt, pp. 108-109; Bisping, p. 8.  
 41 
To conclude, the only situation where a choice of the CESL can be relied 
upon is if the law of a member state is chosen as the applicable law by the 
relevant conflict rules in the case. This is not stated as a prerequisite for the 
application of the CESL. The addition of an explicit requirement to this 
effect has been one of the suggestions presented in the debate in order to 
solve the issue with third state influence. For this suggestion, a parallel can 
be drawn to the CISG, a similar regulation to the CESL. The provisions of 
the CISG only apply if “the rules of private international law lead to the 
application of a law of a contracting state” (article 1.1.b CISG). Critics in 
the debate regarding the CESL have concluded that this kind of additional 
provision could be convenient as supplement to the CESL, but it would 
instead refer to the law of a member state, not a contracting state. 221  
 
Another option to facilitate the application of the proposal is to adopt an 
alternative interpretation of the decision of parties to use the CESL. If this 
decision is interpreted to be the choice of the domestic law of the member 
state with the closest connection to the contract, the Rome Regulations 
cannot make a third state law applicable along with the CESL. On the other 
hand, issues arise as to whether the assumption would meet the 
requirements for a chosen law within article 3 of the Rome I. Here, the 
intentions of the parties to choose a law must be expressed in an explicit 
manner. 222 
 
Another way to reduce the complications of a third state involvement when 
the CESL applies is to change the legal status of the CESL in the Rome I 
(see further regarding the categorisation of the CESL in chapter 5.2.1). 
However, the Commission may have missed out on such an opportunity. 223 
A recital in the Rome I declares the following:  
 
“Should the community adopt, in an appropriate legal instrument, rules of 
substantive contract law, including standard terms and conditions, such instrument 
may provide that the parties may choose to apply those rules” 224 
 
This provision allows a non-national legal regulation to become subject to 
the Rome I. If the provision had been used when the CESL was created, the 
proposal would have had the status of an independent EU legislation in the 
eyes of the Rome I. With this, the proposal had become the 29th European 
contract regime, instead of having its current status as 2nd contract law. In 
other words, the CESL would have been treated like any domestic law 
within the Union. This change of status would remove the step of applying 
the CESL via domestic laws, and thereby eliminate the risk that third state 
law becomes applicable via the Rome I. The change states that this solution 
would be a fundamental improvement of the proposal regarding its legal 
certainty and predictability. 225  
 
                                                
221 Sánchez-Lorenzo, p. 193.  
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223 Sánchez-Lorenzo, pp. 194-195.  
224 The Rome I, recital 14.  
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Creating the CESL’s own set of conflict rules, has also been discussed as a 
way to solve the issues relating to third state involvement. If the CESL had 
its own conflict rules, the choice to apply the proposal would classify as a 
conflict choice of law. If so, the CESL would take precedence over the 
Rome I, or other conflict rules, in accordance with article 23 in the Rome I 
(see chapter 2.2.1). Conflict rules in the CESL would be seen as more 
specific than the Rome I provisions, making the latter regulation no longer 
applicable. 226  
 
The Commission’s decision to apply the CESL via alien conflict rules has 
been criticised ever since the publication of the proposal. 227 A general aim 
when creating international substantive laws is to, as far as possible, 
facilitate the application of such legislation. If this goal is met when a law 
applies via foreign conflict rules, is questionable. 228 Several critics have 
agreed that conflict rules should be added to the CESL. In an article by 
Horst Eidenmuller in The Edinburgh Law Review, the author states that: 
“defining the CESL’s applicability in the regulation itself, and without 
interference from the Rome I Regulation and Member State’s laws, is the 
preferred solution”. 229 The possibility to add conflict provisions to the 
CESL is even listed explicitly in the proposal with the statement: “the 
agreement to use the Common European Sales Law should be a choice 
exercised within […] the [Rome I Regulation], …[the Rome II Regulation], 
or any other conflict of law rule”230. 231 However, the idea to create conflict 
rules for the CESL has not been undisputed. Some argues that due to the 
CESL’s status as a 2nd contract law regime, the principle of subsidiarity is 
respected. The CESL supplements national laws without replacing it232. 233 
 
All in all, several suggestions have been presented in the academic discourse 
regarding how issues on third state involvement, caused by the fact that the 
CESL applies via conflict rules, can be solved. They all comprise ideas on 
how to avoid a third state law from being applicable within the CESL scope 
of application. To summarize, the suggestions include: 1) additions of a 
prerequisite that a member state law must be chosen by conflict rules for the 
CESL to apply (see similar solution in the CISG) 2) the adoption of an 
interpretation that the choice to use the CESL is the choice of the law in the 
member state with the closest connection to the contract 3) a change to the 
status of the CESL in the Rome I 4) addition of independent conflict rules to 
the CESL.  
 
                                                
226 Fogt, p. 103.  
227 See, for example, Fogt, pp. 108-109.  
228 Eidenmuller, p. 7.  
229 Eidenmuller, p. 9.  
230 The CESL, recital 10.  
231 Compare with previous discussion by Eidenmuller, p. 9.  
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Besides the discourse on issues appearing due to the application of the 
CESL via the Rome Regulations, or other conflict rules, a parallel 
discussion has arisen if the provisions of the Rome Regulations can prevent 
the application of the CESL. 234 As previously stated, the CESL is not actual 
national law, even if the proposal clearly states that it should be considered 
as national law (in the form of 2nd national contract law, see chapter 5.2.1). 
In the CESL, the Commission have expressed that the Rome Regulations 
should continue to have the same content and function within the CESL’s 
scope of application. 235 Attention has been drawn as to the question of if the 
CESL is a regulatory framework that can be taken into force via these 
regulations. 236 One argument is that as the CESL cannot be seen as actual 
national law, it cannot be applied via the mechanism of the Rome 
Regulations. The reason for this is that the proposal does not originate from 
a national parliament, like national laws do, but from the EU legislative 
powers. Neither are there any striking aspects of the CESL that makes it 
similar to national law, since it aims to create uniformity in a transnational 
setting. The mere self-categorization of the CESL as national law does not 
make it such in the eyes of the Rome Regulations. 237  
 
However, an alternative argument is that the CESL is applicable due to the 
effect of recital 13 of Rome I. The recital declares that: “this Regulation 
does not preclude parties from incorporating by reference into their 
contract a non-State body of law or an international convention”. The 
CESL, even if not considered national law, could still be applied via the 
Rome I. The CESL clearly satisfies the conditions to be considered an 
international convention in accordance with the requirements in Rome I. 238 
Opponents however, point out that if the Commission want to rely on recital 
13, the status of the CESL has to change. These opponents contest the fact 
that the CESL meets the requirements for an international convention and 
use the fact that the Commission has clearly stated that the proposal should 
be considered as national law in support of this. 239  
 
A third approach has been taken on the issue of whether the CESL is a 
regulatory framework that can apply via the Rome Regulations. Some state 
that this question does not have to be solved at all. The reasoning for such 
an argument is based on the CESL being applied only via domestic laws, in 
accordance with the two-step application procedure (see chapter 5.2.1). The 
process would involve the Rome Regulations, whenever current, choosing 
the applicable domestic law and such domestic provisions to then apply the 
CESL. 240 
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5.3 Problem II: Relation to mandatory law 
provisions 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In addition to the aforementioned issues relating to the CESL and potential 
law conflicts, other compatibility concerns arise in relation to the CESL and 
the Rome Regulations. 241  
 
As formerly mentioned, the CESL will enter into force in a legal area that is 
already regulated to a great extent, for example by national laws and EU law 
provisions. A potential issue here is the relation between the CESL and 
mandatory law provisions that exist within domestic or EU legislation. 242 
Many questions have been raised regarding the issue. Examples of queries 
are if the parties’ freedom to choose the CESL will be limited due to 
existing mandatory rules, or if the outcome of such a collision will depend 
on the type of mandatory provisions that are involved243. The CESL only 
partly answers the concerns that have arisen. 244  
 
5.3.2 Consumer protection 
The majority of mandatory law provisions relevant to cross-border contracts 
concern consumer protection. This is one of few areas that the contracting 
parties, the trader and the consumer, cannot govern. To a certain extent the 
weaker party must be protected. 245  
 
An expressed objective for the CESL regarding consumer protection is to 
create a less fragmented situation in respect of the matter within the EU. To 
achieve this, the CESL aspires to fill pre-existing gaps in current consumer 
rights directives whilst covering new areas where such protection is 
required.246 Critics have stated that these objectives vague describe the 
Commissions’ intentions for how the CESL is to affect current consumer 
provisions and the level of consumer protection that today exists throughout 
the EU. One of the main questions in the academic discourse is whether the 
Commission aspires to raise the consumer protection level in the EU 
through the CESL or if other advantages instead are afforded to consumers 
within the proposal. 247  
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In considering what is stated within the CESL regarding its relation to 
existing mandatory consumer protection rules, the following can be found in 
the explanatory memorandum:  
 
“Under the normal operation of the Rome I Regulation there are however 
restrictions to the choice of law for business-to-consumer transactions. If the parties 
choose in business-to-consumer transactions the law of another Member State than 
the consumer's law, such a choice may under the conditions of Article 6(1) of the 
Rome I Regulation not deprive the consumer of the protection of the mandatory 
provisions of the law of his habitual residence (Article 6 (2) of the Rome I 
Regulation).” 248 
 
Previously, it has been determined that the Commission wished the 
application of the Rome Regulations to remain unaffected by the proposal. 
This presented excerpt from the proposal emphasizes that this also includes 
article 6 in the Rome I regarding consumer protection rules (see also chapter 
2.2.1 regarding provisions in the Rome I). In applying the relevant 
provisions, the law of the consumer’s home state will remain the default 
applicable law if the parties have not agreed on anything else (article 6.1 
Rom I). The parties are not precluded from agreeing on another body of law 
to apply, but this cannot deprive the consumer of mandatory consumer 
protection provisions existing in the law of his/her habitual state (article 6.2 
Rome I). In this aspect, the freedom of choice for the contracting parties is 
limited due to the protection of consumers, and this continues to apply when 
the parties have chosen the CESL to govern their contract. 249  
 
So far, conflict issues regarding the relationship between the CESL and 
mandatory consumer protection rules, applicable due to the Rome I, appear 
to be straightforward to solve. It seems like opting-in to the CESL will not 
change any aspects of the situation. The Rome I will still apply to the 
proposal’s area of application, including article 6, meaning that consumer 
protection rules are still supreme. 250 Although, the excerpt previously 
presented from the explanatory memorandum (see citation above) continues:  
 
“The latter provision [referring to article 6.2] however can have no practical 
importance if the parties have chosen within the applicable national law the 
Common European Sales Law.” 251 
 
A similar statement is also found in the proposal’s preamble:  
 
“Since the Common European Sales Law contains a complete set of fully 
harmonised mandatory consumer protection rules, there will be no disparities 
between the laws of the Member States in this area, where the parties have chosen to 
use the Common European Sales Law. Consequently, Art. 6(2) [Rome I Regulation] 
which is predicated on the existence of differing levels of consumer protection in the 
Member States, has no practical importance for the issues covered by the Common 
European Sales Law.” 252 
                                                
248 The CESL, p. 6.  
249 Compare with the Rome I, articles 3-4. See also Bisping, pp. 2-3.  
250 Fogt, p. 132.  
251 The CESL, p. 6.  
252 The CESL, recital 12.  
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Such statements raise further issues. 253 The declaration that the CESL 
intends to harmonize consumer protection standards within the EU, and 
consequently provide a higher level of consumer protection in all member 
states, has resulted in little resistance. However, a debate has risen regarding 
what the Commission implies with their statement that article 6.2 in the 
Rome I will be of no practical relevance. The possibility that the CESL will 
deprive consumers of a higher protection level in their own domestic law 
seems unlikely, due to the aim of the EU to increase consumer protection 
within the common market. 254 For practical reasons, a trader may argue for 
the opposite: he/she wants to be able to solely rely on the consumer rights 
and duties laid down by the CESL where the CESL is governing the law. 255  
 
If the latter option is the case, the CESL will set a maximum limit for 
consumer protection, a level of protection that the consumers must agree 
upon when opting-in to the CESL. 256 Naturally, this limit is only an issue if 
the law of the consumer’s home state provides a higher level of consumer 
protection than the CESL does. 257 Critics emphasize that even though this 
might not currently be the case, the situation can change in the future. 
Domestic laws can improve their level of consumer protection. Others assert 
that the CESL does not even contain all current domestic consumer 
protection and that the argument that article 6.2 is not needed because the 
CESL contains a complete set of consumer rules, is thereby unfounded. 
Rights currently afforded to consumers may, in fact, be removed. 258  
 
The alternative argument is that the CESL is not made for the purpose of 
strengthening the existing consumer protection in the EU, but to facilitate 
cross-border trade. 259 According to the proposal, it aims to create a balance 
between the interests of the consumer and the trader and also uphold a high 
level of consumer protection throughout the EU. Therefore, these objectives 
could be met even if the CESL was to remove article 6.2. 260 Conspiracy 
theories have flourished stating that the Commission with the CESL wants 
to take away rights from consumers that otherwise would be afforded, in 
order to facilitate cross-border trade and through this create a better 
economy for the EU. The fact that consumers are put in a less favourable 
situation when opting-in to the CESL is exemplified with a provision 
(article 8.2) stating that the parties must decide to use the proposal in a 
separate agreement. Through this agreement the trader will make the 
consumer aware of his or her new obligations and deprived rights. 261  
 
As outlined above, many questions exist regarding how the CESL will 
affect article 6.2 in Rome I. Conflicts may arise in relation to so-called  
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“excess” consumer rights, those rights that are not included in the CESL but 
can be found either in applicable domestic laws or EU provisions. Conflicts 
arise between the CESL and the provisions containing the “excess” 
consumer rights, the latter applicable because of the Rome I. 262  
 
If the Commission tries to deprive consumers their rights contained within 
domestic or EU legislation through the CESL, then this would not be valid. 
The following scenario exemplifies the issue. In the example, a French 
trader and a German consumer have agreed to apply the CESL and French 
law to their contract (article 3 and 6.2 Rome I). With this choice, according 
to the provisions of the CESL, the consumer cannot rely upon German law 
anymore. Only consumer rights found in the CESL apply. If the parties 
instead had agreed that only French law would govern their contract, the 
consumer would still be able to rely upon rights derived from his/her 
domestic law in accordance with article 6.2. Although now, when the parties 
have opted-in to the CESL, the effect is that the consumer cannot call upon 
such consumer provisions in his/her domestic laws. In practice, the 
repercussions will not be as dramatic, since the CESL will cover many of 
the consumer rights found within German laws. Still, the CESL assumes 
that the relevant consumer rights in domestic legislation are found in those 
areas of law that the CESL covers, but there are no guarantees that this is the 
case. As well, there is no logic as to why the CESL (the 2nd German contract 
law) would be superior, and seen as the framework with a more relevant 
range of consumer protection rules, compared to German domestic laws. 
Was this what the consumer intended when he/she opted-in to the CESL? 
The result of the example is that a choice made by the parties to use the 
CESL must include a hypothetical will from the consumer to completely 
exclude, in this case, German law, including the rights falling within the 
scope of article 6.2. Looking at the ordinary rules of interpretation, it is 
difficult to see how the consumer’s choice of the CESL can be interpreted to 
such an extent that would include this intention263. 264  
 
There are also other ways to prove that the CESL’s declaration regarding 
article 6.2 is default. This can be done on the basis that the statement that 
article 6.2 will have no practical importance for contracts covered by the 
CESL, since the proposal contains a full range of mandatory rules, is simply 
false. 265 The CESL clearly declares that it does not cover all aspects of a 
transaction. Considering this, mandatory consumer provisions can occur in 
areas that the CESL does not cover, even if the CESL applies to the 
transaction otherwise. These provisions will be subject to article 6.2 (as long 
as the Rome I applies) regardless of what the CESL may state, because they 
are outwith the proposal’s scope. With this, the result is that article 6.2 will 
be of practical importance in a case where the parties have chosen to apply 
the CESL. It is irrelevant if the parties have chosen a domestic law along 
with the CESL or not, the result will be the same. All in all, the Commission 
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has made a mistake assuming that there are no consumer protection 
provisions existing outside the CESL scope of application. With this 
wrongful assumption, the Commission’s argument regarding article 6.2 is 
unsustainable. 266 
 
The Commission have explained their statement regarding article 6.2 in the 
CESL, but the above arguments are not considered. With the construction of 
the proposal (see also chapter 5.2.1) article 6.2 will not be removed, it will 
only lack practical relevance. Also, consumers will not be deprived of any 
of their rights afforded by domestic law. The excerpt from the CESL 
explanatory memorandum previously presented, stating that article 6.2 will 
be of no practical relevance, continues with an explanation on why this is 
the case: 267 
 
“The reason [for article 6.2 not being of practical relevance] is that the provisions of 
the Common European Sales Law of the country's law chosen are identical with the 
provisions of the Common European Sales Law of the consumer's country. 
Therefore the level of the mandatory consumer protection laws of the consumer's 
country is not higher and the consumer is not deprived of the protection of the law of 
his habitual residence.” 268 
 
Here, the Commission declares that article 6.2 is irrelevant because the 
CESL is national law of the consumer’s home state (a 2nd national contract 
law). Due to this circumstance, the chosen law and the consumer’s domestic 
law are the same legislation: the CESL. Clearly, no gap will exist between 
the CESL and the CESL that requires protection by article 6.2. The Rome I 
will thereby be fully respected, but the 6.2-operation will be of no practical 
relevance. The fact that the CESL is national law is neither a problem seen 
to the current protection given to consumers, the Commission declares, 
because the proposal contains the same consumer protection level as 
domestic laws in the EU. The legality of such a solution, which in effect 
circumvents established consumer protection rules, has been questioned. 269  
 
One of the critics of the Commission’s explanation in the CESL, states that 
the construction is not possible due to what is declared within article 6.2. 
Considering the article’s statement that: “provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of 
choice, would have been applicable”, it is difficult to see how the CESL can 
be considered as the law that would have been applicable if the parties had 
not made an agreement. The only reason that the CESL applies in this case 
is because the parties have agreed to use it. Even if the CESL would have 
status as domestic law, this does not change the circumstances. Hence, the 
“otherwise applicable law” in article 6.2 must refer to the domestic law of 
the consumer’s domicile (see article 6.1 Rome I) and thereby it should be 
that domestic law that is compared with the CESL. Accordingly, the 
consumer can always rely on article 6.2 to invoke rights that are not found 
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within the CESL, since the Rome I is mandatory and binding upon member 
state courts. 270 
 
Regarding how other EU regulatory frameworks relate to mandatory 
consumer provisions, a closer look can be taken at the adopted Consumer 
Rights Directive. 271 In the matter, the directive declares that:  
 
“[i]f the law applicable to the contract is the law of a Member State, consumers may 
not waive the rights conferred on them by the national measures transposing this 
Directive. Any contractual terms which directly or indirectly waive or restrict the 
rights resulting from this Directive shall not be binding on the consumer.” 272 
 
Here, the view seems to be that a complete avoidance of national laws 
cannot be done within the consumer directive’s sphere of application. This 
is since national laws contain the provisions that transpose the directive. The 
position is opposite to what the CESL seems to state in this matter. Critics 
state that the relation between the Consumer Rights Directive and the CESL 
must be clarified, since an adoption of the CESL will not replace or change 
the directive. The same is for other consumer directives in force that might 
have different content than the CESL. Many seem to insist that the CESL is 
a set of consumer protection rules presented in an EU legislation that, due to 
its status and legal character, is superior mandatory consumer law 
provisions coming from domestic laws and those found in EU directives.  273 
 
To conclude, the debate has been intense and the speculations many 
regarding what impact the CESL will have on the current consumer 
protection level for consumers that opt-in to the framework. Most would 
agree that there is a need for clarification in the CESL regarding its relation 
to mandatory consumer protection rules. 274 Two relatively uncomplicated 
alterations have been proposed in order to prevent conflict issues to arise 
with the CESL. The first is that the CESL should let article 6 in the Rome I 
to apply fully within the proposal (and with this take the consumer’s 
domestic law into consideration). The second option is that the CESL 
becomes superior to all other consumer protection rules within the EU. As a 
consequence, only the consumer rights that are found in the CESL can be 
called upon by consumers that have opted-in to the framework. The change 
states that the last option would, however, likely require a change in the 
Rome I, so the first alternative appears the most appropriate. Regardless 
what the solution is, this issue must be clarified in the CESL in order to 
avoid future law conflicts. 275 
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5.3.3 Other mandatory provisions 
As discussed previously, compulsory consumer rules are not the only 
mandatory provisions that exist that the CESL will have to accommodate. 
The CESL has specific rules relating to consumer law provisions, but none 
exist for other mandatory provisions. 276 Issues relating to these are similar 
to those raised in respect of the consumer protection rules, such as if the 
CESL can prevent mandatory provisions from applying or what the outcome 
will be if the CESL contradicts a mandatory provision. 277 Already when the 
CESL presented their Green Paper regarding a common European sales law 
(see chapter 4.1), attention was drawn to the fact that such law must clearly 
regulate its relationship with mandatory rules outside the field of consumer 
law278. Yet, the issue is not mentioned in the CESL. 279 
 
The definition of a mandatory provision is found within Rome I, article 9.1:  
 
“Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as 
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling 
within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this 
Regulation.” 280  
 
A provision falling within the scope of article 9.1 is, for example, a national 
law prohibiting the export of rare cultural objects. In article 9.2, courts are 
given the freedom to apply mandatory rules of the forum where the 
obligation arises from instead of the law otherwise applicable as determined 
by the Rome I. 281  
 
Few mandatory rules fall under the definition of article 9.1 that would 
currently overlap with the CESL scope of application. Article 9 should be 
interpreted restrictively and is applicable only in “exceptional 
circumstances”. 282 Besides, many provisions that could fall under article 
9.1, for example a ground for invalidating a contract due to public policy 
considerations, are already found within the CESL. A group of rules 
identified as not included in the CESL, but ones that could fall within the 
scope of article 9, are those regarding unfair contract terms283. 284 Whether 
they can be invoked in a case where the CESL applies, due to article 9 in 
Rome I, is unclear. 285  
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However, some assert that there is unlikely to be any major law conflicts 
between mandatory law provisions (not regarding consumer protection) and 
the CESL. Both can apply fully. This is the case as if mandatory rules are 
not included in the CESL, they fall outwith the proposal’s scope of 
application. Outwith the CESL, the Rome I is applicable without any 
reservations including article 9. Due to this, a mandatory provision cannot 
be neglected by the proposal. Even if a mandatory rule were considered to 
be within the CESL area of application, it would still apply. The reason for 
this is that the Commission has stated that the Rome Regulations remain 
valid and unchanged when considering the CESL. Any specific bypassing of 
article 9 has never been stated by the Commission as part of the proposal. 
Conflicts will thereby never occur between the CESL and mandatory law 
provisions falling under the scope of article 9 in Rome I. 286 
 
5.4 Problem III: The CISG relation  
5.4.1 Comparing the CESL and the CISG 
When generally considering the CESL (see chapter 4) and the CISG (see 
chapter 3.2.4), it can be concluded that a difference between an optional 
framework (like the CESL) and a non-optional one (such as the CISG), is 
that a non-optional instrument, normally, does not depend on conflict rules 
for its application. Without this procedure, many conflict issues are avoided. 
Regarding the CISG, the regulatory framework applies by default when all 
contracting parties involved have their place of business or they reside in a 
state that has ratified the legislation (article 1.1.a CISG). 287 The application 
of a non-optional law can also, occasionally, be done via conflict rules. In 
the CISG, article 1.1.b declares that its provisions can be used even if only 
one of the parties involved is a contracting state, as long as international 
conflict rules point out that contracting state’s law as applicable. Conflict 
rules can thereby extend the application of the CISG. Otherwise, they are 
not involved in the process of making the legislation that will govern the 
parties’ contract. 288 
 
When comparing the CESL and the CISG, it can be determined that their 
legislation types also differ in other ways. The CISG has been submitted as 
a fragmentary global framework, while the CESL is a comprehensive 
regional instrument. The latter is regional because it applies only to either 
cross-border transactions within the EU or to transactions between a 
member state and a third country. Also the structures of the regulatory 
frameworks differ. The CISG is made in line with a traditional treaty model, 
while the categorisation of the CESL is more uncertain. The proposal is a 
EU legislative instrument, but it is not made like a classic directive. Such 
                                                
286 Bisping, p. 16 and p. 18; Piers & Vanleenhove, p. 13.  
287 Fogt, pp. 92-93.  
288 Fogt, pp. 92-93; DiMatteo, pp. 231-232. 
 52 
directives must normally be implemented by member states in order for its 
provisions to become in force. 289  
 
Despite these differences and the fact that the CESL and the CISG are two 
separate frameworks with separate provisions, they are not entirely 
dissimilar in their area of application. An overlap is by many seen as 
unavoidable, since both relate to sales and contract rules regarding cross-
border trade. 290  Corresponding substantive provisions, rules regarding 
specific issues that both the CESL and the CISG enclose, are, for example, 
ones comprising obligations of the buyer and the seller in conjunction to a 
purchase (chapters 10 and 12 in the CESL, chapters 2-3 in the CISG), as 
well as provisions regarding the passing of risk between parties (chapter 14 
in the CESL, chapter 4 in the CISG). 291 Regarding the types of contracts 
these provisions target, their common area of application is B2B contracts, 
or more specifically B2SME contracts. 292 This distinction between B2B and 
B2SME is done since the CISG only covers trade between professional 
traders (article 2.a CISG) and the CESL only encloses those B2B contracts 
where at least one of the parties is a SME (article 7.1 CESL). It should 
thereby be possible to conclude that there will be no conflicts between the 
CESL and the CISG regarding B2C contracts. However, this may not 
always be the case. It has been speculated that there can be a collision 
between the CISG as an international instrument of harmonization and the 
CESL in the form of European consumer law. If this would be the case, 
conflicts between the frameworks would occur in both B2B and B2C 
contract situations. 293 
 
5.4.2 Subsequent complications 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (chapter 5.4.1), the CESL and the 
CISG relate differently to conflict rules. The CESL applies via conflict 
legislation, while the CISG normally does not. However, this statement does 
not reveal anything about how a conflict between the CESL and the CISG 
would be dealt with in a private international law context. 294  
 
Since the previous chapter also stated that the CESL and the CISG overlap 
in their area of application, concerns have been raised that the CESL will 
cause law conflicts with the CISG if the proposal is adopted. 295 Today, 24 
of the 28 EU member states have ratified the CISG. 296 This means that the 
vast majority of member states would have to deal with law conflicts 
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between the CESL and CISG when opting-in to the CESL. 297 Several 
questions have arisen in the matter. The first question is what the outcome 
will be if the CESL and the CISG regulate the same situation in different 
ways, in other words, which regulatory framework that is superior. How the 
practical opt-in and opt-out procedures of the instruments affect each other 
must also be clarified, in order to understand their relation. If the parties opt-
in to the CESL, does this mean that they opt-out of the CISG and/or vice 
versa? 298 
 
The intended relationship between the CESL and the CISG is found in the 
preamble of the CESL. The Commission acknowledges that there is a risk of 
conflicts between the frameworks and this requires a solution. 299 The 
preamble states that:  
 
“Where the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods would otherwise apply to the contract in question, the choice of the Common 
European Sales Law should imply an agreement of the contractual parties to exclude 
that Convention.” 300 
 
The Commission’s view in the matter is that an opt-in to the CESL results in 
an opt-out of the CISG. The procedure seems simple. 301 The solution has 
however been subjected to criticism as to whether it is valid. 302  As 
concluded, the CESL clearly states that an opt-in to the proposal will lead to 
an opt-out of the CISG. To opt-out of the CISG can however, according to 
the framework itself, not be done implicitly. There is no legislative support 
for asserting that an opt-in to the CESL includes an opt-out of the CISG. 
The CISG is not an EU regulation. It determines its own scope and opting-
out of the CISG must therefore be done in accordance with what the 
framework instructs on the matter (see article 6 CISG). 303  
 
According to the CISG, it can be opted-out of if the following requirements 
are met:304 1) the parties are aware of the CISG and its application in their 
specific case 2) the parties have, in a clear manner, decided to opt-out of the 
CISG and act consistently with that decision 3) a bilateral consensus 
develops as to the parties’ agreement to opt-out of the CISG and settle on 
which law that should apply instead of it. Such requirements are difficult to 
meet in practice, especially if the parties involved are small or medium-
sized businesses. Such enterprises usually have a more limited knowledge of 
the CISG and its provisions and may not meet the requirements of an opt-
out. This means that the CISG applies by default when these types of 
businesses are involved as contracting parties. 305 Parties to a contract can 
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meet the requirements previously stated to opt-out of the CISG whenever 
the CESL is applicable, but only a provision in the CESL is not a valid exit 
out of the CISG. A statement is simply not enough. As a result of this 
finding, the argument is that the CESL provision cannot have any affect on 
the CISG. 306 
 
If the CESL cannot regulate and avoid a collision between the CESL and the 
CISG (in order words, if the opt-out provision in the CESL is considered to 
be invalid), the question is how it can be determined which one of the 
frameworks is superior in the event of a conflict. This has been a lively 
debate. 307 
 
A collision between the CESL and the CISG is argued to be exceptionally 
difficult to solve. The reason for this is that neither of the instruments is 
more specific than the other, which makes the lex specialis rule difficult to 
apply. An argument exists that the CESL is the more specific framework, 
and thereby superior to the CISG, because it applies due to an active and 
more specific act of the parties compared with a default application. Also, 
the CESL is a regional instrument, which is generally considered as a more 
specific alternative than the CISG. On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that the precedence origins from the dignity of the law. Therefore, the last-
mentioned argument can likewise be used in favour of the CISG, with the 
argument that a global framework is superior to a regional. 308 Reasoning 
similar to the latter is that the CISG is superior because of the fact that it is a 
more established legislation. The CISG has been in force for many years 
and should therefore be seen as supported by an international body of case 
law. 309  
 
The issues of the relationship between the frameworks appear not to be 
solved by reference to the statuses of each regulatory body. Therefore, a 
closer examination has been made of the provisions of the CISG, the one 
legislation in force, in order to find an answer to the problem. In the matter, 
it can be concluded that article 90 and 94 of the CISG deal with issues 
connected to the relation between the CISG and similar conventions. Article 
90 is a conflict rule applicable when a CISG member state adapts a new 
international agreement, bilateral or multilateral, and this process creates a 
divergence between the CISG and the new regulation. 310 The article states 
that:  
 
“This Convention does not prevail over any international agreement which has 
already or may be entered into and which contains provisions concerning the matters 
governed by this Convention, provided that the parties have their places of business 
in States parties to such an agreement.” 311  
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The excerpt shows that the CISG only gives another framework precedence 
if the parties have their residence in a state that is party to the new 
agreement and such a state decides to generally displace the CISG in favour 
of a future international agreement. Additionally, the new rules only apply 
in situations where the CISG is current due to its “main application rule”, 
because all involved parties are parties to the contract (see further regarding 
the application in chapter 5.4.1). With this, it is argued that the CESL can be 
superior to the CISG if it is considered to be an international agreement in 
the way that article 90 of the CISG states. Opinions differ as to whether the 
requirements for this are satisfied or not. Some state that all EU legislation 
can be seen as international agreements in accordance with the article, since 
they are transnational law regulations with states as parties to the 
agreements. Considering this, the CESL is superior to the CISG. Others 
have reasoned that EU contract law provisions cannot be seen as 
international agreements in accordance with the article 90. So far, EU 
contract law has only appeared as directives. These are not international 
agreements, but demands for change at domestic level. On the other hand, 
the CESL will not be a directive, but a freestanding regulatory framework 
that parties can opt-in to. This does not matter for opponents. They 
emphasize that member states do not ratify EU provisions and neither are 
member states subject to the regulations like contracting states usually are to 
international agreements. Accordingly, no form of EU legislation can be 
considered as an international agreement seen to article 90 of the CISG. The 
CESL can thereby not be superior to the CISG. 312  
 
Whether article 90 of the CISG can regulate the priority between the CESL 
and the CISG, article 94 of the CISG needs to be explored further. The 
reason for this is that the article could be used in order to make the CESL 
superior to the CISG and thereby the law conflict could be solved. 313 The 
article addresses the following: 
 
    “1) Two or more Contracting States which have the same or closely related legal 
rules on matters governed by this Convention may at any time declare that the 
Convention is not to apply to contracts of sale or to their formation where the parties 
have their places of business in those States. Such declarations may be made jointly 
or by reciprocal unilateral declarations. 
    (2) A Contracting State which has the same or closely related legal rules on 
matters governed by this Convention as one or more non-Contracting States may at 
any time declare that the Convention is not to apply to contracts of sale or to their 
formation where the parties have their places of business in those States. 
    (3) If a State which is the object of a declaration under the preceding paragraph 
subsequently becomes a Contracting State, the declaration made will, as from the 
date on which the Convention enters into force in respect of the new Contracting 
State, have the effect of a declaration made under paragraph (1), provided that the 
new Contracting State joins in such declaration or makes a reciprocal unilateral 
declaration.” 314 
 
This provision could be used for the CESL in order to exclude the 
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application of the CISG through operation of law. It could be done through 
a common EU declaration of neighbouring reservations. This would make 
the CISG non-applicable in cases where the CESL applies in accordance 
with the CISG’s own provision (article 94). However, this has been stated as 
a radical move to be made by the EU. How it would be facilitated within the 
CESL, and whether such a reservation would actually be valid, is not 
elaborated upon within academic discourse. 315 
 
Other, perhaps less radical, ideas have been presented for creating a priority 
between the CESL and the CISG with the use of the current provisions of 
the CISG. One example has been to make the application of article 90 
wider. This would include the article to cover those harmonization measures 
taken by the EU with their legitimacy originating from EU Treaties316. This 
kind of extended application of article 90, the rule that gives supremacy to 
other laws over the CISG, could make the CESL superior to the CISG. This 
move would, however, result in the CISG eventually losing its influence in 
the EU. 317  
 
To conclude, if the construction in the CESL regarding the opt-out of the 
CISG is void there seems to be no clear answer, but several different 
solutions, to the priority between the frameworks. An obvious solution 
cannot be found in either the CESL, general principles of law, or in the 
CISG. However, not everyone agrees that the CESL opt-out process is void, 
but even so, law conflict issues seem to appear. The reason for this is that 
the opt-out statement is vague regarding what it encloses and there is no 
further information existing regarding the matter, other than the previously 
presented excerpt from the CESL. 318 The issue of whether the statement 
refers only to those rules in the CISG that have a counterpart in the CESL or 
of all provisions are covered, is not clarified. 319 Questions have therefore 
risen regarding what the outcome will be if parties to a contract have opted-
in to the CESL and then have to deal with an issue that is not regulated in 
the CESL, but covered by the CISG. This could, for example, be the case 
when a part of a contract comprises of the seller performing a transport 
related to a purchase320. The example is one of many where the CISG 
applies, but the CESL does not. 321  
 
In this matter, many have stated that the CESL and the CISG should not be 
used in the same situation and that an opt-in to the CESL therefore implies a 
complete opt-out of the CISG, including those provisions that cannot cause 
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a collision with the CESL. 322 A critic accentuates that the CESL and the 
CISG should under no circumstances apply at the same time, since this 
would create a too complicated law conflict situation in the matter. The 
domestic law that conflict rules chose as the applicable should govern those 
areas that the CESL does not cover. 323 Some say that the CESL and the 
CISG cannot apply simultaneously, but a subsequent law conflict arises due 
to domestic laws not filling in the “internal CESL-gaps”. Instead, these gaps 
must be dealt with in accordance with the objectives and underlying 
principles of the CESL. This does not necessarily mean that the domestic 
applicable law (chosen by conflict rules) or international principles (for 
example the PECL or lex mercatoria) should be used. The most convenient 
solution proposed is that EU law applies where the CESL does not. 324  
 
Despite the previous, some do believe that the CESL and the CISG can 
apply at the same time according to the CESL proposal. Thereby, they do 
not agree that an opt-in to the CESL implies a complete opt-out of the 
CESL; only those specific provisions that collide will be targets. An opinion 
in favour of this view states that the CISG should fill in gaps after an 
application of the CESL in a case and that national law, as a third step, 
should cover those areas that the CISG does not regulate. Using the CISG to 
fill in gaps where the CESL cannot apply would give the advantage of 
uniformity in cases where the CESL is chosen, compared to what would be 
the case if different domestic laws had this role325. This solution would be 
more suitable with the purposes of the CESL, since the proposal intends to 
create harmonization within its area of application. Therefore, the CISG 
preserves a useful role as a “gap-filler” along with a CESL application. 326 
                                                
322 DiMatteo, p. 234.  
323 Magnus, p. 12.  
324 Fogt, p. 95.   
325 Which domestic law that would apply depends on the applicable conflict rules.  
326 Piers & Vanleenhove, pp. 19-20.  
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6 Analysis 
After the examination of current conflict rules (chapter 2), transnational 
substantive sales and contract provisions that the CESL may collide with 
(chapter 3), the CESL proposal (chapter 4) and the three most pertinent 
conflict issues in the legal discourse regarding the CESL (chapter 5), the 
following can be concluded as the most central conflict of law issues 
expected to arise if the CESL enters into force: 
 
Potential conflict issues: the CESL and conflict rules 
 
Initially, the conclusions regarding the relationship between the CESL and 
current conflict rules can be set-out. Firstly, the CESL is a framework of 
special substantive rules. The relation of these provisions to current conflict 
rules is that they apply via conflict rules and domestic law, through a two-
step application procedure. This means that conflict rules will decide which 
domestic law that applies, and, in turn, the domestic law will make the 
CESL applicable. The CESL will appear as a 2nd contract law regime within 
the chosen domestic system. In other words, the proposal does not have its 
own set of conflict rules. When applying the CESL, such rules must be 
utilised due to the fact that the proposal regards cross-border trade.  
 
Applying the CESL via the Rome Regulations, or other conflict rules, will 
likely result in law conflict issues. These issues will arise due to the fact that 
the proposal is not completely compatible with current conflict rules. 
Accordingly, a choice to use the CESL will be void if relevant conflict 
provisions makes a third state law applicable within the CESL scope of 
application. The reason for the nullity is that the CESL only is applicable 
within a member state law. It can also been discussed whether the CESL at 
all can apply via the Rome Regulations, as these regulations only can take 
domestic laws or international agreements into account. Whether the CESL 
falls within either of these categories has been debated. Some critics in the 
academic discourse believe that this question does not need to be discussed 
due to the two-step application procedure, which results in the CESL being 
validly applied via domestic laws.  
 
Another conflict issue connected to the relationship between the CESL and 
conflict rules, is how the CESL and mandatory law provisions will relate to 
each other. Here, discussion have regarded the Commission’s somewhat 
unclear construction of the CESL’s relationship with article 6.2 of the Rome 
I. The Commission believes the CESL to include all consumer rights that a 
consumer, who opts-in to the CESL, needs. However, this view has met 
with opposition. The validity of the construction of article 6.2 Rome I in the 
CESL, which results in the article having no practical relevance, has been 
questioned. There is great confusion regarding the CESL’s effect on current 
consumer protection level within EU. This confusion coupled with the 
vague explanation given by the Commission and the CESL, will create law 
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conflicts. If the CESL is deemed to contain less favourable consumer 
protection than as would otherwise have been afforded by the applicable 
domestic law according to the Rome Regulations, there will be a collision 
between the proposal and domestic laws.  
 
Potential conflict issues: the CESL and substantive provisions  
 
The next matter to consider is the potential law conflicts between the CESL 
and transnational substantive provisions regarding sales and contract law 
that the proposal may collide with.  
 
The PECL, the PICC and the DCFR are all regulatory frameworks that aim 
to provide instructions for how future laws and provisions should be shaped 
in a suitable way within the area of international trade law. Among them, 
the provisions with the most influence on the content of the CESL have 
been the DCFR. However, these frameworks can also be used to govern a 
specific international transaction. This alternative is only the case if 
contracting parties actively opt-in. Law conflict between the CESL and the 
PECL/PICC/DCFR will thereby only occur if parties opt-in to the latter. 
Accordingly, it does not matter if such frameworks contain corresponding 
provisions and a similar intended area of application as the CESL; no 
conflicts will appear solely by the act of adopting the CESL.  
 
However, a substantive framework that is most likely to cause law conflicts 
in relation to the CESL is the CISG. Given the striking resemblance 
between the CESL and the CISG, this may not be a vast surprise. The 
reason for the occurrence of such conflicts is because the CISG, unlike the 
aforementioned frameworks, is not an opt-in instrument. It applies by 
default whenever the requirements for its application are met. In many 
situations where the CESL could govern a contract, the CISG will already 
be applicable. The cause of this is that both frameworks have a partly 
overlapping scope, namely certain provisions regarding B2SME contracts. 
Accordingly, enforcement of the CESL will cause an immediate conflict 
with the CISG. 
 
Considering the previous, the CESL has stated that whenever the proposal is 
opted-in to, the CISG is opted-out of. This solution has, however, been 
heavily criticized. First, it has been questioned if the opt-out provision is 
valid due to the fact that it does not meet the requirements for an opt-out of 
the CISG, as set out within the CISG itself. Allowing the CISG to regulate 
this question would be the easiest solution as the legislation is already in 
force and binding upon contracting states. Secondly, law conflicts will still 
occur even if such an opt-out provision was to be considered valid, because 
it is indistinct what it means. Either it refers to a complete opt-out of the 
CISG whenever the CESL applies, or it refers only to those provisions that 
conflict. In other words, there will be law conflicts between the CESL and 
the CISG regardless of the validity of the CESL opt-out provision.  
 
 60 
Lastly, the relationship between the CESL and existing EU contract laws are 
worthy of consideration. Currently, EU contract law has only appeared in 
the form of directives, mainly concerning protection for consumers. The EU 
may seem to act in a contradictory manner if the CESL and contract law 
directives regulate an issue differently. Still, such a divergence will not 
cause any law conflicts between the CESL and these directives. The 
directives are implemented into national laws and are not currently 
considered as independent laws that can apply simultaneously with the 
CESL. Due to the fact that they will be considered domestic law they will be 
overruled by the CESL in accordance with the parties’ choice to use the 
proposal. However, if the directives relate to mandatory consumer 
protection provisions, the conflict is separate and discussed previously.  
 
Considered the above, the only transnational substantive law regime likely 
to conflict with the CESL will be the CISG. Although it will be the only 
collision regarding the CESL and similar substantive provisions, it is still an 
extensive problem for the Commission.  
 
Proposed solutions 
 
At this point, central conflict issues likely to occur if the CESL is brought 
into force have been investigated and presented. Several solutions to these 
issues have been presented in the academic discourse. First, it can be 
determined that there is no clear solution to the conflicts. Of the solutions 
presented, none appear to include any major amendments to the CESL.  
 
In short, proposed solutions for the issues that arise when applying the 
CESL via conflict rules, mainly the Rome Regulations, have focused upon 
the possibility of the CESL incorporating its own set of conflict rules. If this 
cannot be incorporated, the risk of third state law influence would at least be 
minimized with, for example, a prerequisite in the proposal stating that the 
CESL is only applicable when a member state law is chosen by current 
conflict rules. Another solution suggested is that the parties’ choice to apply 
the CESL is interpreted to be the choice of the law in the member state with 
the closest connection to the contract.  
 
Regarding conflict issues connected to the application of mandatory 
provisions, suggestions for solving these have also been mentioned. Here, 
the solutions have been to either let all of article 6 Rome I apply unmodified 
in relation to the CESL, and, with this, allow the CESL to be compared with 
the domestic law in the consumer’s domicile or decide that within the scope 
of the CESL only the rules contained within the proposal can apply. The 
latter suggestion would, however, require a change in the Rome 
Regulations. Overall, greater clarity has been demanded in order to reduce 
the possibility of law conflicts.  
 
Concerning the potential conflicts between the CESL and the CISG, further 
explanation regarding the matter has been demanded by critics in order to 
reduce the possibility of conflicts between the instruments. Some seem to 
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think that the Commission’s solution within the CESL is acceptable and 
applicable, but have stated that the CESL opt-out provision needs to be 
clarified. Others state that a priority between the frameworks cannot be 
validly created by the CESL, but that such priorities can be found in other 
areas of law, for example the CISG or in general principles of law.  
 
The CESL – a regulatory framework for the future?  
 
The Commission had a tall task facing them when they decided to create a 
transnational law regarding cross-border trade to further the interests of the 
EU. The fact that it had to function within, and be compatible with, the legal 
area of private international law would have been evident to the drafters. 
The CESL proposal has hardly been rushed, since it has taken over ten years 
to develop and it has still not entered into force. With this in mind, the EU, 
and in particular the Commission, had adequate time to discuss and evaluate 
potential law conflict issues that the CESL may create. Still, there has been 
little recognition of them, either within the proposal itself or via any other 
avenue by the Commission. Nevertheless, they seem to believe that the 
CESL will facilitate trade within the Union whilst hoping that major law 
conflicts will not occur when the proposal is in force. If the Commission 
had solutions to the predicted clashes, they would have presented them, but 
there may exist no real answers to the potential issues. The area of 
international trade law is too complex and crowded for law conflicts to be 
completely avoided.   
 
What the Commission aims for with the CESL, is not mainly to facilitate for 
those traders and consumers that already engage in cross-boarder trade. 
They want this commerce to grow and to attract new market entrants. 
Therefore, in my opinion, it is not unlikely that the EU would try to gather 
the applicable consumer provisions within the CESL and thereby setting a 
“maximum limit” of protection for consumers that opt-in to the CESL. From 
the perspective of traders, it is advantageous to know that the only consumer 
protection that can be called upon is contained within the provisions of the 
CESL.  
 
Regardless of the underlying intentions for the proposal, it has previously 
been concluded that several law conflict issues are predicted to appear with 
an adoption of the CESL. Looking to them and looking at the suggestions 
presented to solve them (see previous conclusions), it can be stated that 
several minor changes can be made in the CESL in order to minimize the 
possibility of law conflicts. Some of these changes, in my opinion, should 
also be carried out. These include allowing article 6 of the Rome I to remain 
unchanged within the CESL and therefore allowing consumers, which have 
decided to opt-in to the proposal, to invoke rights falling under article 6.2 in 
the Rome I. The article can simply not be discarded and ignored due to it 
allegedly being “of no practical relevance”. Likely, a favourable change 
would also be if the CESL had its own set of conflict rues. However, a 
modification of the proposal’s status may be a violation of the subsidiarity 
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principle in EU law and thereby an act beyond EU competence. With this 
change, the CESL would no longer be a supplement to national laws.   
 
Yet, even if changes were made to the CESL, law conflicts will still occur 
with the proposal in force. The legal area that the CESL will operate within 
is simply too crowded and complicated for no conflicts to arise. Therefore, 
the question comes down to whether the advantages will outweigh the 
disadvantages of implementing the proposal. Within this matter, two 
questions can be asked regarding the necessity of the CESL. The first is 
whether the CESL will apply to new circumstances, compared to for 
example the CISG, to such an extent that it outweighs the complications 
likely to arise. In my opinion, the answer to this is no. Although the CESL 
covers some new grounds that cannot be found in similar existing regulatory 
frameworks, this is not to a great extent. The second question is to what 
extent market actors will opt-in to the CESL if it enters into force. I do not 
believe that consumers or small traders will use the CESL. The majority of 
these actors refrain from cross-border trade because they feel uncertain of 
the provisions that will apply to a potential issue arising from the 
transaction, but this problem is not cured by the CESL. Consumers and 
smaller traders will feel the same way about the CESL as they feel about 
other foreign laws that may apply to their situation. In this matter, it is better 
for the EU to use directives to create a more uniform contract law within the 
Union, at least regarding these types of smaller market actors, even if it is 
quite a slow and ineffective process. However, choosing the full 
harmonization directive option for the CESL is not a preferred idea. Such an 
act would be an excessive judicial intervention, at least for those traders and 
consumers that are uninterested to become affected by any part of the 
proposal.  
 
All in all, my final opinion and conclusion regarding the matter examined in 
this thesis is that there are too many gaps in the CESL regarding its 
conformity with private international law. This will lead to a multitude of 
law conflict issues. Following implementation is of such severity that the 
Commission should seriously consider if the proposal should be brought 
into force at all. If the disadvantages of the CESL, due to the law conflict 
issues it creates, outweigh the advantages to cross-border trade then the 
CESL would have no practical benefits.   
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